A/HRC/8/3 page 20 however, the more pertinent question concerns the content of the right and, in particular, the extent to which States are required to respect certain procedural safeguards in order to ensure the integrity of the right. This question has been highlighted in recent years at the international and national levels and it is now timely to draw upon these developments in order to better understand the implications of the right concerned. 60. For present purposes, the formulation contained in article 6 (4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be considered to reflect accurately the formulation of the right: “Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.”73 The right thus has two separate parts. The first is the right of the individual offender to seek pardon or commutation. This implies no entitlement to receive a positive response, but it does imply the existence of a meaningful procedure through which to make such an application. But this right can, with relative ease, be rendered illusory. This may be achieved through the adoption of various approaches that are designed to, or have the effect of, turning the relevant procedures into a formality as a result of which no genuine consideration is accorded to the case for pardon or commutation. The second part of the right is the need to ensure that amnesties, pardons and commutations are not precluded by actions taken by the legislature or other actors to eliminate the relevant possibilities from the spectrum of available remedies. This is a right which preserves the “sovereign” powers of the relevant State authorities and underscores the fact that, even when the judicial process has been exhausted, those authorities retain the right to opt for life over death for whatever reason. 61. It is pertinent to mention cases in which each of these component parts of the right have been threatened. The first part - the right to seek pardon or commutation - was raised by the Government of the United States in the Avena case before the International Court of Justice.74 The Government argued that clemency procedures ensured that every person sentenced to death received a reconsideration of his or her case prior to execution. In response, while leaving open the possibility that a clemency process could be devised that would meet its requirements, the Court made clear that the procedures actually followed did not come close to providing the sort of safeguards required. Apart from their lack of procedural safeguards, the chances of a successful application in some States was close to zero.75 The second part of the right has been jeopardized by developments in Guatemala, beginning with an initiative in 2000 which 73 The same principle is reaffirmed in the Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty adopted by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1984/50, para. 7. 74 75 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12. Nicholas Berg, “Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins”, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. (2005) 121, at 145-46.