A/HRC/3/2 page 145 205 Out of these 162, 55 rounds were between 0 and 25 meters from the position or were fired low over it. In one particular incident, 26 tank rounds were fired low over UN position 4-31 (UTM 7520) by Israeli tanks at UTM (7516-6878). 206 ICRC Study, rule 33. 207 ICC Statute, articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and (e)(iii). 208 St. Petersburg Declaration, preamble. Hague Regulations, article 25; GC Additional Protocol I, articles 48 and 49; CCW Protocol II, articles 3(2) and 3(7); GC Additional Protocol II, article 13(2). 209 Third Geneva Convention, article 23; Fourth Geneva Convention, article 28; GC Additional Protocol I, articles 12, 51 (7) and (8), 57 and 58. 210 An overview of the weapons used by IDF during the conflict is at Annex XI. 211 See Annex XI on Cluster munitions. 212 OCHA. A lasting Legacy - The deadly impact of cluster bombs in Southern Lebanon. 19 September 2006. The United Nations humanitarian coordinator for Lebanon, David Shearer noted: “In the three last days, a tremendous amount of them were fired. It’s also hard to know where they were aimed. The dispersion of the bombs is so wide that even if the original target were outside a populated area, many bombs fell amid the houses.”, in Meron Rapoport. “What lies beneath”, Haaretz, 8 September 2006 http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/760246.html (retrieved on 8 November 2006). 213 Discussions with UN MACC, 18 October 2006. 214 Meron Rapoport. “When rockets and phosphorous cluster”, Haaretz, 17 September 2006 http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/761910.html (retrieved on 8 November 2006). 215 Meron Rapoport. “What lies beneath”, Haaretz, 8 September 2006 http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/760246.html (retrieved on 8 November 2006). 216 Meron Rappaport. “When rockets and phosphorous cluster”, Haaretz, 17 September 2006 http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/761781.html (retrieved on 8 November 2006). 217 218 According to UNIFIL and UNMACC sources. DU gives a shell or bomb far greater penetration of armour or of hardened bunkers. It could have been utilized in tank ammunition. However, this capability was probably not required by the IDF as their opponents did not possess the sophisticated armour capability to warrant its use. It is possible that aircraft dropping precision bunker busting bombs of the Guided Bomb Unit 28 varieties (GBU-28) might have utilized depleted uranium in their warheads. There was a great deal of circumstantial evidence that such aerial bombs were used.