A/HRC/3/2 page 63 271. In the view of the Commission, the blockade imposed by Israel against Lebanon needs to be analyzed from three different perspectives. The first is related to the impact of the blockade on the humanitarian situation in Lebanon during and after the conflict. From a second perspective, the blockade needs to be analyzed in the light of the Commission’s findings of the environmental damage. Finally, the Commission addressed the question of the crippling effects the blockade had on the Lebanese economy. 272. Parties to a conflict need to take into consideration the impact of the conflict on the civilian population. One of the most important aspects to consider is that of access to humanitarian assistance. Yet, as indicated by OCHA at the outset of the conflict, the Israeli-imposed blockade limited tremendously the work of humanitarian agencies by leaving only one entry point, by land, through Damascus.230 It was not until the second week of the conflict that Israel began considering expanding humanitarian entry points for relief aid to be sent into Lebanon. In this respect, for example, OCHA reported on 25 July that it was still seeking authorization for two ships arriving from Cyprus with an aid cargo to be allowed to land in Beirut.231 On 30 July, OCHA indicated that “the road between Aarida, on the Lebanon-Syria border, and Beirut is currently the only road open continuously”.232 Yet, on 4 August this road was also bombarded by IDF, thus seriously disrupting the overall provision of humanitarian aid.233 In general, access to ports in Beirut, Tripoli and Tyre was, at best, sporadic, thus forcing humanitarian agencies to continue using ground transportation through Damascus as the sole means for the transfer of aid supplies to the entire country. For instance, two WFP tankers carrying 87,000 tons of fuel and food supplies could not enter into Lebanese waters due to the lack of adequate security guarantees by the Israeli navy.234 The two ships were not allowed to dock until 13 August.235 Similarly, the Commission received reports of other cargo ships being unnecessarily held off the Lebanese coasts, thus delaying the distribution of urgent humanitarian supplies to the civilian population.236 273. The Commission also considered the impact of the blockade on the environmental catastrophe that followed the Israeli attacks on the Jiyyeh power station. The Commission finds that the blockade unnecessarily obstructed the deployment of immediate measures to clean or contain the oil spill. It was not until shortly before the end of the conflict that initial clean up operations along the coast could actually be initiated under the authority of the Lebanese Ministry of Environment and the Lebanese Army. By then, the oil slick had moved north and had already contaminated a large extent of the Lebanese coast, including its archaeological sites, as well as parts of the Syrian coast.237 The Commission finds that the Israeli Government should have ordered an immediate relaxation of the blockade to allow the necessary urgent evaluation to be made, assessment measures to be adopted and the necessary cleanup measures to be carried out. In the view of the Commission there is no reason that justifies a failure to do so. Israel’s engagement in an armed conflict does not exempt it from its general obligation to protect the environment and to react to an environmental catastrophe such as that which took place on the Lebanese coasts. 274. Finally, there is no doubt that the blockade had tremendous negative effects on the Lebanese economy. The Lebanese Government has estimated the loss in public finance due to the conflict at around 1.6 billion dollars, with the blockade having a very high impact on the loss of revenue.238