A/HRC/19/69 II. Context A. Domestic political developments 14. The Government maintains that the opposition is part of a foreign conspiracy and that Government military and security operations target terrorists. On 10 January 2012, the President affirmed that “restoration of security and fighting terrorism with an iron fist” remained its foremost priority.7 At the same time, the Government has pressed forward with an agenda of holding elections and adopting new laws, including regarding political participation and the media. On 13 February, the President received the draft of a new Constitution and announced that it would be subjected to a referendum on 26 February. One of the stated objectives of the text would be a political system “based on political pluralism” and sets out a presidential term limit. 8 Local elections were held on 12 December 2011; according to the Government, a participation rate of 80 per cent was recorded. Parliamentary elections are announced to follow in May or June 2012. On 15 January, the President decreed the latest of four general amnesties (see also paragraph 66 below). 15. Protests against the Government continued in many parts of the country, although they tended to be more brief and localized to avoid the security forces. Demonstrations in support of the Government were also organized in different governorates. 16. The political opposition in the country has organized itself mainly through local coordination committees under the umbrella of the Syrian Revolutionary General Commission. The committees have taken a leading role in organizing protests and humanitarian relief. The opposition “Syrian National Council”, comprising a diverse set of members ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to secular formations and representatives of local coordination committees, sought to present itself as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, although other opposition groups exist inside and outside the country. The Syrian National Council has rejected any political dialogue with the Government under present conditions. Serious rifts apparently remain within the Council itself, and between the Council, whose leadership largely resides abroad, and other parts of the opposition. B. Increasing violence and polarization 17. In recent months, the crisis has become increasingly violent and militarized. The State‟s campaign of violently suppressing dissent, which from the outset employed lethal force against peaceful protests, was followed by defections and the formation of antiGovernment armed groups. The rise of an armed opposition led the Government to intensify its violent repression. 18. Many among the anti-Government armed groups identify themselves as FSA and consist of defectors (mainly from the army) and an increasing number of armed civilians. The FSA leadership resides abroad and its control over the different FSA groups inside the country remains unclear. In mid-January, the FSA leadership and the Syrian National Council agreed to improve their coordination. 19. Most FSA groups initially adopted a defensive posture. More recently, a number of FSA groups carried out offensive operations targeting checkpoints, installations of State 7 8 http://sana.sy/eng/21/2012/01/10/393338.htm. http://sana.sy/eng/36/2012/02/16/400646.htm. 7