A/HRC/10/20 page 9 13. The authors of a study based on the data displayed in the graph above4 concluded that “the ceasefire was remarkably effective; after it began in June 2008, the rate of rocket and mortar fire from Gaza dropped to almost zero, and stayed there for almost four months”. The experience of the temporary ceasefire demonstrates both the willingness and the capacity of those exerting control in Gaza to eliminate rocket and mortar attacks. 14. Beyond this, records show that, during the ceasefire, it was predominantly Israel that resorted to conduct inconsistent with the undertaking, and Hamas that retaliated. According to the above-mentioned study, during a longer period, from 2000 to 2008, it was found that, in 79 per cent of the violent interaction incidents, it was Israel that broke the pause in violence. In the course of events preceding the attacks of 27 December, the breakdown of the truce followed a series of incidents on 4 November in which Israel killed a Palestinian in Gaza, mortars were fired from Gaza in retaliation, and then an Israeli air strike was launched that killed an additional six Palestinians in Gaza; in other words, the breakdown of the ceasefire seems to have been mainly a result of Israeli violations, although this offers no legal, moral or political excuse for firing of rockets aimed at civilian targets, which itself amounts to a clear violation of international humanitarian law. 15. Furthermore, Hamas leaders have repeatedly and formally proposed extending the ceasefire, including for long periods.5 It is notable that the President of the United States of America, Barack Obama, has called for this result in a statement accompanying his appointment of a special envoy on the Israel/Palestine conflict: “As part of a lasting ceasefire, Gaza’s border crossings should be open to allow the flow of aid and commerce.” This assertion is consistent with the call made by the Security Council in its resolution 1860 (2009) for unimpeded provision and distribution throughout Gaza of humanitarian assistance, including food, fuel and medical treatment, which in effect prescribes the end of the blockade of Gaza that has been maintained by Israel in violation of articles 33 and 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 16. The continuing refusal of Israel to acknowledge Hamas as a political actor, based on the label of “terrorist organization”, has obstructed all attempts to implement human rights and address security concerns by way of diplomacy rather than through reliance on force. This refusal is important for reasons already mentioned (see paragraph 3 above), namely, that the population density in Gaza means that reliance on large-scale military operations to ensure Israeli security cannot be reconciled with the legal obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention to protect to the extent possible the safety and well-being of the occupied Gazan population. 4 N. Kanwisher, H. Haushofer and A. Biletzki, “Reigniting violence: how do ceasefires end?”, 24 January 2009. 5 “When this broken truce neared its end, we expressed our readiness for a new comprehensive truce in return for lifting the blockade and opening all Gaza crossings, including Rafah.” Khalid Mish’al, “This brutality will never break our will to be free”, in The Guardian, 6 January 2009. Also available from www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/06/ gaza-israel-hamas (accessed 3 March 2009).