A/HRC/42/CRP.3 Figure 3: Arms and Military Equipment Suppliers to the Tatmadaw VI. Conclusions and recommendations 177. In its September 2018 report, the Mission found that the Tatmadaw and forces under its control were responsible for the majority of violations and crimes committed in Kachin, Shan and Rakhine State, as documented by the Mission. 423 The Mission recommended that a political, constitutional and legislative reform process transform the place, role and power of the Tatmadaw and other security forces, including through removing military prerogatives in politics and the economy.424 178. This report, on the economic interests of the Tatmadaw, further substantiates that recommendation, illustrating how the Tatmadaw uses its web of commercial interests, established through military-linked companies and subsidiaries, relationships with State-owned enterprises and private crony companies, to secure financial resources to support its activities and personnel. In doing so, the Tatmadaw insulates itself from accountability and oversight. Through controlling its own business empire, the Tatmadaw can evade the accountability and oversight that normally arise from civilian oversight of military budgets. 179. In addition, this report has begun to illuminate the role that other corporate actors play in contributing to or benefiting from the human rights and international humanitarian law violations of the Tatmadaw. Foreign companies with joint ventures and other commercial relationships with the Tatmadaw, Myanmar business donors to the Tatmadaw’s operations, and arms suppliers are in some cases legally implicated in the conduct of the Tatmadaw, and in all cases complicit through their tacit acceptance 423 424 62 A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paragraph 1554. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paragraph 1631.