A/HRC/23/21 military leader, Ahmed Jabari, was assassinated in a targeted killing. It was a safe assumption that the assassination of such a high-value target would trigger strong retaliation from Gaza. This was confirmed by widely-respected Israeli peace activist Gershon Baskin, who confirmed that Jabari, at the time he was killed, was in the final stages of negotiating a long-term ceasefire with Israel. In an article published during the operation, Baskin pointed out that Israel had tried every military option to crush the capacity and will of Gaza to engage in violent resistance, adding that “the only thing it has not tried and tested is reaching an agreement for a long-term mutual ceasefire.”5 As Baskin pointed out, Jabari had long been in Israeli crosshairs and was known to have masterminded the capture and detention of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Jabari was the leader who had kept Shalit alive and in good health while in captivity for several years, and had prevented rogue militias in Gaza from engaging in violence against Israel. He had also acted to uphold prior ceasefires that had stemmed the level of violence on the Gazan border in recent years, which directly contributed to keeping Israeli casualties at zero since Operation “Cast Lead.” 9. Israel justified Operation “Pillar of Defense” as a defensive response to Gaza rocket fire. The United States of America, along with several European countries, supported this claim. The United States Department of State expressed this sentiment when the attacks started: “We support Israel’s right to defend itself, and we encourage Israel to continue to take every effort to avoid civilian casualties”. 6 Supporters of Palestine regarded Israel’s concerted use of force against urbanized and vulnerable Gaza as “aggression” and “criminal”. Israeli military analysts argued that the strategic purpose of Operation “Pillar of Defense” was to restore deterrence in the light of the recent increase in violence emanating from Gaza and to destroy the capacity of Gazan military forces to launch long-range rockets. 7 Both sides claimed victory when the ceasefire agreement brokered by Egyptcame into effect on 21 November 2012. The Israeli side avoided a ground attack that had turned the tide of public opinion against its operation in 2009, and took some steps to avoid civilian casualties. On the Gazan side, casualties to police and militants were greatly reduced by avoiding targeted facilities and taking secure shelter, and damage to rocket launchers was reduced by greater mobility and use of underground launching sites. The terms of the ceasefire lend support to the claim of the de facto authorities in Gaza that Israel had given ground: agreeing not to engage in future targeted assassinations, and to meet to discuss the opening of crossing points for goods and people. The implementation of the ceasefire agreement is discussed below. 10. The mission of the Special Rapporteur had the objective of gathering information on the situation in the Gaza Strip in the light of a United Nations study that suggested that Gaza’s viability would be at serious risk by 2020.8 The Special Rapporteur did not abandon that goal, but additional concerns arose regarding Operation “Pillar of Defense”, since the ceasefire went into effect only 10 days before the Special Rapporteur’s arrival. Several aspects of the attacks raised serious international humanitarian law issues bearing on the use of excessive force in relation to a population living under conditions of occupation. Although Israel implemented its plan of “disengagement” in 2005, it did not end its legal responsibilities as the occupying Power. This conclusion reflects Israel’s control of entry 5 6 7 8 6 “Israel’s Shortsighted Assassination”, New York Times, 16 November 2012. Available from www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/opinion/israels-shortsighted-assassination.html?_r=0]. United States. Department of State press statement, 14 November 2012. Available fromwww.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200551.htm. Shlomo Brom et al., In The Aftermath of Operation Pillar of Defense, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, 2012, pp. 7-8. United Nations country team, Gaza in 2020: A liveable place? August 2012. Available fromwww.unrwa.org/userfiles/file/publications/gaza/Gaza%20in%202020.pdf.