A/HRC/28/74 50. What the above discussion shows is that, in the process of identifying appropriate mechanisms to assess and/or to promote accountability to mitigate the effects of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, efforts should, at a minimum, be made to avoid, or at least to minimize, any potential controversy regarding the limits of the territorial and jurisdictional mandate of the treaty bodies. One obvious way of doing this would be to eschew the treaty bodies as the mechanism of choice for the task. 51. This would lead to the consideration of the Charter-based bodies as the more preferable mechanisms of choice to undertake the assessment and/or to promote accountability to mitigate the adverse impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, since the mandates of these bodies are formulated in a more flexible manner. This stems from the fact that the Charter of the United Nations, the source from which the Charter-based bodies ultimately derive their mandates, calls for all States Members to pledge to take joint and separate action to achieve universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction to race, sex, language and religion (Arts. 55 and 56). The language used is clearly more flexible and better avoids potential controversy with regard to jurisdiction, which could be used to distract and even impede the assessment of unilateral coercive measures and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights. B. The accountability imperative 52. The fact that States that impose unilateral coercive measures with an impact on the enjoyment of human rights of the civilian population of targeted or non-targeted States ought to be accountable in some way for their actions is a matter beyond debate. Indeed, the entire human rights system would be much weaker were accountability of one kind or another not one of its main goals, without which the entire human rights system would lose its rationale. For instance, in the area of addressing poverty reduction and the right to development, which has historically witnessed one of the largest accountability gaps in the broader field of human rights, the creation of institutions that ensure accountability has been deemed imperative. Indeed, the key documents that will shape the post-2015 development agenda have called for development efforts to be driven and shaped by building “accountable institutions for all,”51 and further emphasized the need to establish “a participatory monitoring framework for tracking progress” and “mutual accountability mechanisms for all stakeholders”.52 According to a working paper prepared for the Commission on Human Rights, the full array of legal remedies should be available for victims of sanctions regimes at any point for the violation of international law, notably national courts, international or regional human rights bodies and the International Court of Justice.53 53. All United Nations human rights bodies, be they treaty-based or Charter-based, suffer to a similar degree from a lack of a supranational authority that can enforce their demands on States that have allegedly violated their human rights obligations. 54 All of these bodies exact accountability in a similarly “softer way”, primarily through a slower, more 51 52 53 54 See United Nations, A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development. Report of the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (New York, 2013). A/68/202, para. 75. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, para. 106. See O.C. Okafor, The African Human Rights System, Activist Forces and International Institutions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 40–61. 15