A/HRC/26/32 functions. As a result, transparency in the judiciary must be guaranteed so as to avoid corrupt practices that undermine judicial independence and public confidence in the justice system. 40. The Statute of the Iberoamerican Judge, in its article 14, establishes that judges can be suspended or removed from office for reasons of physical or mental incapacity, negative assessment of their professional performance in the cases where the law so provides, or criminal or disciplinary responsibility, by the bodies legally established through procedures that guarantee the respect of due process. 41. The Declaration of Minimum Principles on the Independence of Judiciaries and Judges in Latin America, adopted by the General Assembly of the Latin American Federation of Judges in 2008, states that, as a general rule, judges are not personally civilly liable for their decisions, with the exception of cases of fraud or intentional misconduct. Moreover, in cases of repeated omission or excessive and unjustified delay attributable to judges, they should be liable for negligence, but through disciplinary action only; additionally, judges’ civil responsibility can be sought only after all possibilities of procedural and appellate claims have been exhausted and only by the civilly aggrieved party. The Declaration further stipulates that both civil action, when admissible, and criminal action directed against judges, including arrest, should be exercised under conditions that cannot aim to influence the judges’ judicial activity (para. 11). The Declaration also makes reference to activities which are incompatible with judicial functions, such as judges joining political parties, performing political party activities, or exercising a political activity or holding political office (para. 7 b (6)). 42. The Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption, adopted by the African Union in 2003, enumerates among its objectives the establishment of the necessary conditions to foster transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs (art. 2, para. 5). It also provides that States parties undertake to create an enabling environment that will allow civil society and the media to hold governments to the highest levels of transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs (art. 12). 43. The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa also make reference to the liability of judicial officers, stating that they shall not be “liable in civil or criminal proceedings for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions” or “removed from office or subject to other disciplinary or administrative procedures by reason only that their decision has been overturned on appeal or review by a higher judicial body” (A 4 (n)). 44. The Beijing Statement of Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted in 1995 by the Sixth Conference of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific, makes an indirect reference to accountability mechanisms for judges. It states that “judges should be subject to removal from office only for proved incapacity, conviction of a crime, or conduct that makes the judge unfit to be a judge” (para. 22). 45. In addition to those international and regional instruments, the human rights treaty bodies and regional human rights mechanisms have developed significant jurisprudence addressing the importance of judicial accountability for the effective realization of human rights, which will be discussed later in the report. 46. Nevertheless, the lack of an international instrument that directly and specifically addresses the issue of judicial accountability reveals a serious gap. Filling that gap could be critical to defining and implementing the principle of judicial accountability in line with the principle of judicial independence and other relevant international human rights standards. 8