A/HRC/23/47 LAR violations.57 Since a commander can be held accountable for an autonomous human subordinate, holding a commander accountable for an autonomous robot subordinate may appear analogous. Yet traditional command responsibility is only implicated when the commander “knew or should have known that the individual planned to commit a crime yet he or she failed to take action to prevent it or did not punish the perpetrator after the fact.” 58 It will be important to establish, inter alia, whether military commanders will be in a position to understand the complex programming of LARs sufficiently well to warrant criminal liability. 79. It has been proposed that responsibility for civil damages at least should be assigned to the programmer and the manufacturers, by utilizing a scheme similar to strict product liability. Yet national product liability laws remain largely untested in regard to robotics.59 The manufacturing of a LAR will invariably involve a vast number of people, and no single person will be likely to understand the complex interactions between the constituent components of LARs.60 It is also questionable whether putting the onus of bringing civil suits on victims is equitable, as they would have to bring suit while based in a foreign country, and would often lack the resources. 80. The question of legal responsibility could be an overriding issue. If each of the possible candidates for responsibility identified above is ultimately inappropriate or impractical, a responsibility vacuum will emerge, granting impunity for all LAR use. If the nature of a weapon renders responsibility for its consequences impossible, its use should be considered unethical and unlawful as an abhorrent weapon. 61 81. A number of novel ways to establish legal accountability could be considered. One of the conditions that could be imposed for the use of LARs is that responsibility is assigned in advance.62 Due to the fact that technology potentially enables more precise monitoring and reconstruction of what occurs during lethal operations, a further condition for their use could be the installation of such recording devices, and the mandatory ex post facto review of all footage in cases of lethal use, regardless of the status of the individual killed.63 A system of “splitting” responsibility between the potential candidates could also be considered.64 In addition, amendments to the rules regarding command responsibility may be needed to cover the use of LARs. In general, a stronger emphasis on State as opposed to individual responsibility may be called for, except in respect of its use by nonstate actors. 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Rome Statute of the ICC, art. 28; Heather Roff “Killing in War: Responsibility, Liability and Lethal Autonomous Robots” p. 14, available from http://www.academia.edu/2606840/Killing_in_War_Responsibility_Liability_and_Lethal_Autonomo us_Robots Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977, arts. 86 (2) and 87. Patrick Lin “Introduction to Robot Ethics” in Patrick Lin et al (eds.) Robot Ethics: The ethical and Social Implications of Robotics (MIT Press, 2012), p. 8. Wendell Wallach “From Robots to Techno Sapiens: Ethics, Law and Public Policy in the Development of Robotics and Neurotechnologies” Law, Innovation and Technology Vol. 3 (2011) p. 194. Gianmarco Verugio and Keith Abney “Roboethics: The Applied Ethics for a New Science” in Lin, (see note 59 above), p. 114; Robert Sparrow “Killer Robots” Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 24, No. 1 (2007). See Ronald Arkin “The Robot didn‟t do it” Position Paper for the Workshop on Anticipatory Ethics, Responsibility and Artificial Agents p. 1, available from http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robotlab/publications.html Marchant (see note 26 above), p. 7. Krishnan (see note 31 above), 105. 15