A/HRC/28/38 universality and the essence of international human rights law, as well as create structural incentives for States to outsource human rights violations. 40. One observer made the point that that in all cases where the use of armed drones under international humanitarian law was being assessed, a careful evaluation should be undertaken to establish whether an armed conflict existed and if so, what type. However, States had sometimes denied that international humanitarian law applied to a situation that might be said to amount to an armed conflict, whereas on other occasions they had extended the applicability of international humanitarian law to situations that did not fit the legal description of an armed conflict. The observer noted that many questions related to the applicability of humanitarian law to drone strikes could be more easily resolved if the classification of situations of violence were carried out with a focus on the existing legal criteria. 41. In response to a question about the criteria used to determine the existence of a noninternational armed conflict, particularly with regard to non-State armed groups, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism noted that the two core criteria used were the degree of organization of the armed groups involved and the intensity of hostilities. Indicators of the degree of organization included a common command structure, adequate communications, joint mission planning and execution and cooperation in the acquisition and distribution of weaponry. In that respect, he noted that many had questioned whether Al-Qaida continued to meet the criterion of organization, because its leadership and command structure might appear to have become so degraded that it no longer constituted in itself a sufficiently organized armed group. Regarding the question of “co-belligerency”, he noted that there was considerable doubt that the various armed groups that operated under the name of Al-Qaida in different parts of the world, or claimed to be affiliated to AlQaida, shared a sufficiently integrated command structure or mounted enough joint operations as to be regarded as a single armed group. Turning to the criterion of intensity of conflict, he noted that it had been argued with some justification that this criterion was no longer being met outside the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq, given the time that had elapsed since the events of 11 September 2001 and the relative infrequency of organized armed attacks against the United States since then. 42. Many delegations expressed concerns that armed drones had a negative impact on families and communities, on the right to education and to religion and on individuals that tried to assist victims for fear of secondary strikes. Some noted that the deaths of civilians could not be qualified as “collateral damage”, while another noted that no threat to security could justify such attacks. Some speakers noted that victims of armed drones did not benefit from due process rights, access to judicial review or rights of defence. One NGO noted that States had an obligation to provide due process to individuals suspected of acts of terrorism. 43. It was stressed that States must honour their legal obligations with regard to targeted killings taking place within their territory, including by recognizing that they could not consent to violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law committed on their territory by foreign States. The Director of International Law and Protection Programmes at the International Commission of Jurists noted that, before giving consent to a particular operation, a State must, at a minimum, require the targeting State to demonstrate verifiably that the person against whom lethal force was to be used was a legitimate target, to ensure that the targeting State would comply with all applicable law, including the requirement to use a graduated response before resorting to lethal force, and would comply with the prohibition against excessive or disproportionate loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects. 44. One State emphasized that the use of drones was counterproductive, as it fomented hatred in a population, further nurturing and fuelling terrorism. Another delegation noted 13