A/HRC/28/38 15. The Director of International Law and Protection Programmes at the International Commission of Jurists noted that the application of international law to the use of armed drones was too often based on an incorrect point of departure. He noted that, as was concluded by the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights of the International Commission of Jurists, States had inappropriately used the war paradigm to contextualize counter-terrorism operations, and that this also applied to the use of armed drones.1 He noted first, that armed drones had not always been used in situations of armed conflict under international humanitarian law. Many instances of targeted killings appeared to have occurred outside the context of hostilities between two or more parties to an identifiable conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law (see, for example, A/68/389 and A/HRC/25/59). In a number of instances in which drones had been deployed, including in the context of countering terrorism, the level of intensity of armed operations and/or of organization of the armed groups had not reached the level which would engage international humanitarian law. He also emphasized that a careful assessment must be made as to whether each situation did in fact rise to the level of armed conflict. When armed drones were not used in a situation of armed conflict, domestic law and international human rights law were the primary laws that applied to the lethal use of drones. In a situation that did rise to the level of an armed conflict, international humanitarian law was relevant in determining whether a killing was unlawful or arbitrary, but international human rights law remained applicable concerning investigations, criminal accountability and the need for effective remedies and reparations. 16. The Legal Director of the Foundation for Fundamental Rights elaborated on the principles of proportionality and necessity in the use of lethal force. He recalled that where a State claimed that it was necessary to use deadly force because it had no other means of capturing a suspected terrorist, it must prove that the individual in question posed an imminent threat to human life. He noted that armed drones were often not used to counter an imminent threat or where there were no other alternatives and that he had documented dozens of drone strikes in North Waziristan where there was no evidence that the individual killed posed an imminent threat to another individual, or to the State. In order to illustrate the point, he referred to the case of Tariq Aziz, a teenager involved in documenting the effect of drone strikes in North Waziristan. Three days before he died, he had attended an international conference on drones in Islamabad. Upon his return home, he was killed in a drone strike together with his younger cousin, outside his aunt’s house. Mr Akbar recalled that in all cases, the onus was on the State using armed drones to prove that the use of force was absolutely necessary and proportional. 17. Mr. Akbar also referred to the practice of engaging in “signature strikes”, a term used to distinguish strikes conducted against individuals who match a pre-identified “signature” of behaviour, which is said to be linked to militant behaviour, which takes no account of the principles of necessity and proportionality in the use of force. To illustrate this, he referred to three drone strikes between 2006 and 2009, on a jirga (grand council) meeting in which 40 attendees were killed; on a madrasa, in which 80 children, the youngest aged seven, were killed; and on a funeral at which 80 individuals were killed. He stressed that in none of those cases was there evidence, or even a claim, that “high value targets” or “named, known militants” were killed. He concluded that the current use of drones in Pakistan threatened and undermined the right to life and the rule of law more broadly. 1 6 Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Assessing Damage, Urging Action (International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 2009).