A/HRC/33/54 regarding these claims and agreed in an out-of-court settlement to pay $6.5 billion dollars to the “holdouts”.27 24. The settlement represents a further setback in the process aimed at setting up an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism based on the equal treatment of creditors, and human rights experts have expressed profound regret. Paying vulture funds much more than what was paid to cooperative creditors in previous debt restructuring is a disturbing outcome. Rewarding those who refuse to participate in debt restructuring efforts sends the wrong message.28 25. Doubts arise as to whether this settlement will be advantageous from a human rights perspective. Indeed, putting an end to more than a decade of judicial disputes may, in the short term, reinforce the country’s credibility and allow it to borrow on the international financial markets. But in order to pay the “holdouts”, the Government has been forced to increase its debt burden, a fact that, in the long run, may hinder the State in complying with its obligations in the area of economic and social rights, thereby also exacerbating inequality and financial instability. 26. In any event, this long judicial dispute highlights the pressing need to regulate speculative investment practices in order to bring them into line with human rights approaches and requirements. Furthermore, it has prompted a process aimed at establishing a multilateral mechanism with a mandate to resolve sovereign debt litigation in an independent and impartial manner. 27. Although the legal consequences of this case should not be underestimated, its final outcome must be read in the light of the particular circumstances that surrounded the dispute and the evident political implications involved therein. There is no doubt, however, that the doctrine endorsed by the United States courts provides vulture funds with increased credibility that will certainly incentivize them to pursue these strategies further in the future.29 IV. Disruptive litigation: a growing trend 28. The case of Argentina is not an exception, but forms part of a more general trend. Increasingly, non-cooperative creditors are reaping extraordinary profits owing to settlements reached or judgments obtained after disruptive litigation. Not only do investors’ expectations of obtaining high returns by suing countries asphyxiated by onerous financial terms benefit from the lack of a global mechanism on debt restructuring, but they may also be at the origin of this state of affairs. 27 28 29 Raising the funds required the biggest bond sale by a developing country, worth $16.5 billion dollars with an interest rate between 6.5 and 8 per cent. “Sovereign debt: curing defaults”, Financial Times, 7 June 2016. See also Official Records of the General Assembly, 107th plenary meeting, 9 September 2014 (A/68/PV.107), p. 6. OHCHR, information note, “Hold-out deal in Argentina makes solving debt crises more difficult, United Nations rights experts say”, 8 March 2016. Debt and Development Coalition Ireland, “Stop debt vultures: implications of the vulture attack on Argentina”, 1 September 2014. 9