A/HRC/33/40 (b) Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Canada, concerning a precautionary fracking moratorium enacted in Quebec; (c) Vattenfall AB and others v. Germany (2009), concerning the imposition in Hamburg of environmental standards for water use at a coal-fired power plant; (d) Vattenfall AB and others v. Germany (2012), concerning the decision of Germany to phase out nuclear energy; (e) TransCanada Corporation and TransCanada PipeLines Limited v. The United States of America, in connection with President Obama’s decision to oppose building the controversial Keystone XL pipeline as part of the commitment of the United States to tackle climate change; (f) Cosigo Resources, Ltd. and others v. Colombia, concerning denial of a permit to mine in the Amazonian rainforest. Colombia is being sued for $16.5 billion in “lost profits.” 46. Moreover, the same type of cases already decided by investor-State dispute settlement arbitrators in favour of corporations could be filed under the proposed investment court system, including: (a) William Ralph Clayton and others v. Canada, concerning an environmental impact assessment that prevented the construction of a large quarry and marine terminal in an ecologically sensitive locality; (b) Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, concerning the denial of a permit for a toxic waste deposit. 47. Those cases raise both human rights and constitutional questions. Can a State constitutionally allow such interference with its policy space? Can a State repudiate its duty to take precautionary measures, demand human rights, health and environmental impact assessments,38 regulate taxation or raise the minimum wage? The State has a constitutional obligation to protect the population not only from an invading enemy army but also from private actors, including monopolies, cartels and corporate predators. The State has the obligation to prohibit certain business activities in order to protect the lives and welfare of the population. No State can turn its back on independent, transparent and accountable public courts. 48. Another question concerns the legal effect of the consent purportedly given. Have States that ratify bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements effectively given consent to the run-away jurisdiction of investor-State dispute settlement or the investment court system? Is consent perfected or only inchoate? There is a peremptory norm of customary international law that jurisdiction is based on consent. That norm is based on the practice of sovereign States. 49. To illustrate that point, it is instructive to recall that the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is not universal or automatic, but conditioned on a declaration given by the State pursuant to Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. That declaration of consent can also be withdrawn. Two or more States can consent to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by ad hoc compromis. Yet another possibility of establishing jurisdiction is through treaty clauses, by virtue of which a State undertakes to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. Over 300 treaties contain such clauses, 38 GE.16-11938 Guiding principles on human rights impact assessments of trade and investment agreements; James Harrison and Alessa Goller, “Trade and human rights: what does ‘impact assessment’ have to offer?”, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 8, No. 4 (2008), pp. 587-615. 11