A/HRC/27/56 laudable aim of attempting to end violence imminently, amnesties for such violations11 have not only been shown to further entrench a culture of impunity,12 but also to be counterproductive as they fail in the long run to prevent the recurrence of new violations and vicious circles of violence. 32. Reasons for the tendency to opt against accountability are complex and manifold: one of them is the perception that prosecutions may threaten incipient, transitional institutions and that, in any case, results are too difficult to attain. One of the main objectives of the present report is to demonstrate that there are strategies that can be followed to contain the risks that have proved to be effective and that have led to defensible results. V. Strengthening accountability through prosecutorial prioritization strategies 33. Countries in transition, whether post-authoritarian, post-conflict or which combine features of both, are characterized by a large number of crimes committed with the involvement of possibly several thousands of individuals, leaving behind a massive number of victims. Prosecuting and judging all of those responsible at the outset of a transition might be simply impossible, especially considering the credibility, capability and resource constraints faced almost inevitably by judiciaries in the aftermath of repression and/or conflict, particularly in weakly institutionalized contexts.13 34. The standard approach to prosecutions in most domestic jurisdictions is to take cases as they are received and, usually, to treat them individually. Thus, most jurisdictions do not develop explicit prioritization strategies. 35. A prosecutorial strategy is part of a system of laws, political measures and funding priorities, involving the adoption of concrete courses of action. At the broadest general level, a prosecutorial strategy consists of a framework for giving direction to investigations, concentrating prosecutorial efforts and guiding the deployment of necessary resources. It is a “focalizing” tool. 36. In transitional situations, where compliance with legal norms is often low, violations are frequently the result of complex systems organized with criminal intent or enabled by severe, systemic failure, and judicial systems show themselves unable to deal with their caseloads while offering all required due process and fair trial guarantees, not adopting a prioritization strategy may be particularly detrimental. The main risks include: (a) Institutions severely weakened by repression and/or conflict, with low levels of credibility, capacity and resources, may end up dispersing and duplicating investigations and multiplying caseloads; (b) Acting on the implicit promise of addressing cases in the order received may lead to large numbers of poor investigations, weak indictments and, as a result, acquittals 11 12 13 S/2004/616, S/2011/634 and Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice (March 2010); see also International Committee of the Red Cross, Report of the Third Universal Meeting of National Committees for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, p. 32, stressing the prohibition of amnesties for international crimes. www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14824&LangID=E. Siri Frigaard, “Some introductory remarks”, in Morten Bergsmo, ed., Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes Cases, FICHL Publication Series No. 4 (2010), pp. 1–3. 7