A/HRC/14/46 provide remedies to the individuals concerned if such violations occur.64 Accordingly, they take steps to regulate and manage their intelligence services in a manner that promotes respect for the rule of law and in particular, compliance with international human rights law.65 Executive control of intelligence services is essential for these purposes and is therefore enshrined in many national laws.66 F. Individual responsibility and accountability Practice 15. Constitutional, statutory and international criminal law applies to members of intelligence services as much as it does to any other public official. Any exceptions allowing intelligence officials to take actions that would normally violate national law are strictly limited and clearly prescribed by law. These exceptions never allow the violation of peremptory norms of international law or of the human rights obligations of the State. 22. While great emphasis is placed on the institutional responsibilities of intelligence services, individual members of intelligence services are also responsible and held to account for their actions.67 As a general rule, constitutional, statutory and international criminal law applies to intelligence officers as much as it does to any other individual. 68 Many States have made it a cause for civil liability or a criminal offence for any member of an intelligence service to knowingly violate and/or order or request an action that would violate constitutional or statutory law.69 This practice promotes respect for the rule of law within intelligence services, and helps to prevent impunity. Many States give members of their intelligence services the authority to engage in activities which, if undertaken by ordinary citizens, would constitute criminal offences.70 It is good practice that any such authorizations be strictly limited, prescribed by law and subject to appropriate safeguards.71 Statutory provisions that authorize intelligence officers to undertake acts that would normally be illegal under national law do not extend to any actions that would violate the Constitution or non-derogable international human rights standards. 72 Practice 16. National laws provide for criminal, civil or other sanctions against any member, or individual acting on behalf of an intelligence service, who violates or 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 14 Croatia (footnote 2), art. 87(1); Human Rights Committee, general comment no. 31 on the nature of the general legal obligations imposed on States parties to the Covenant (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13), para. 4; Michael Defeo, “What international law controls exist or should exist on intelligence operations and their intersect.s with criminal justice systems?”, Revue international de droit penal 78, no.1 (2007), pp. 57–77; European Commission for Democracy through Law, opinion 363/2005 on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, p. 15. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, art. 36. See also practice 6. ECOWAS Code of Conduct, arts. 4 and 6. International Commission of Jurists, “Assessing damage, urging action”, report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, pp. 85–89 (hereafter ICJ-EJP report); Imtiaz Fazel, “Who shall guard the guards?: civilian operational oversight and Inspector General of Intelligence”, in “To spy or not to spy? Intelligence and Democracy in South Africa”, p. 31. Morton Halperin, “Controlling the intelligence agencies”, First Principles, vol. I, No. 2, October 1975. United Kingdom (footnote 47), arts. 1, 4; United Kingdom (footnote 20), sect. 7. With regard to engaging in criminal activities as part of intelligence collection, see Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 21 (3); United Kingdom (footnote 47), arts. 1, 4; United Kingdom (footnote 20), sect. 7. South African Ministerial Review Commission, pp. 157–158. Netherlands (footnote 20), annex. GE.10-13410