A/HRC/14/46 senior managers in intelligence services, the politically accountable executive and a (quasi) judicial body.113 36. States also ensure that intelligence collection is subject to ongoing oversight by an institution that is external to the intelligence services. It is good practice for intelligence services to be required to report on the use of collection measures on an ongoing basis and for the external oversight institution to have the power to order the termination of collection measures.114 In many States, external oversight bodies also conduct ex post oversight of the use of intelligence-collection measures to ascertain whether or not they are authorized and used in compliance with the law.115 This is particularly important in view of the fact that the individuals whose rights are affected by intelligence collection are unlikely to be aware of the fact and, thus, have limited opportunity to challenge its legality. J. Management and use of personal data Practice 23. Publicly available law outlines the types of personal data that intelligence services may hold, and which criteria apply to the use, retention, deletion and disclosure of these data. Intelligence services are permitted to retain personal data that are strictly necessary for the purposes of fulfilling their mandate. 37. There is a number of general principles that apply to the protection of personal data that are commonly included in national laws116 as well as in international instruments.117 These include the following requirements: that personal data be collected and processed in a lawful and fair manner; that the use of personal data be limited and confined to its original specified purpose; that steps be taken to ensure that records of personal data are accurate; that personal data files be deleted when no longer required; and that individuals have the right to have access to and correct their personal data file.118 In the context of personal data use by intelligence services, the opening, retention and disposal of personal data files can have serious human rights implications; therefore, guidelines for the management and use of personal data by intelligence services are set out in public statutory law. This is a legal safeguard against giving the executive or the intelligence services unchecked powers over these matters.119 A second safeguard is that legal guidelines are established to specify and 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 GE.10-13410 Canada (footnote 6), sect. 21; Germany (footnote 106), sects. 9–11 and 15(5). See also Canada, MacDonald Commission, pp. 516–528. Croatia (footnote 2), art. 38 (2); United Kingdom (footnote 47), sect. 9(3–4); Germany (footnote 106), sect. 12 (6). See also Canada, MacDonald Commission, p. 522. United Kingdom (footnote 47), sect. 57(2); Norway, Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee; Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 64(2)(a). Japan, Act on the Protection of Personal Information held by Administrative organs; Switzerland, Loi fédérale sur la protection des données. A/HRC/13/37, paras. 11–13. For specific examples of international principles, see the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (No. 108); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data (1980); The Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal data Files (General Assembly resolution 45/95 and E/CN.4/1990/72). It should be acknowledged that international agreements permit derogation from basic principles for data protection when such derogation is provided for by law and constitutes a necessity in the interest of, inter alia, national security. See Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (No. 108), art. 9. European Court of Human Rights, Weber and Saravia v. Germany, no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006, paras. 93–95. 21