A/HRC/36/52 Spring, this trend remains: the looted States (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen) have recovered only $1 billion of the $165 billion stolen by their former dictators. 15 12. Attempts to repatriate stolen assets most commonly imply undertaking long, complex and costly mutual legal assistance procedures which, in the best scenario, may end up with the repatriation of only a portion of the misappropriated assets to the country of origin. 16 The burden of reaching a solution essentially relies on the good faith and the success of the cooperation between the concerned States.17 13. Proving the illicit origin of the stolen money often turns out to be an unsurmountable requirement in practice. 18 Difficulties in such procedures may lead a State to conclude extrajudicial agreements by means of which impunity is granted to those who looted the public funds in exchange for recovering a part of the assets. 19 14. It is striking to see how the money that has been stolen and is urgently needed for development and the realization of all human rights is instead stalled in banks of developed countries that continue to accrue gains from it. 20 As long as the “dirty money” remains frozen, banks continue to charge their “captive clients” particularly high management commissions. 15. The role played by banks as facilitators of money-laundering and corruption very often goes unnoticed. Domestic laws require enhanced scrutiny of politically exposed persons, but such laws are often not observed.21 In addition, offshore jurisdictions provide a perfect regulatory set-up to those seeking to obscure links to money, by means of shell companies, nominee directors and secrecy. 22 IV. Best practices in the return of illicit funds 16. A number of global best practices in the return of illicit funds can be discerned from the available evidence. If globally adhered to, these best practices will help in ensuring that countries of origin have much greater access to the necessary funds to ensure the enjoyment 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 6 Countries: Measuring OECD Responses (2014), p. 88. Available from www.oecd.org/corruption/Illicit_Financial_Flows_from_Developing_Countries.pdf. Transparency International, Lost Billions: Recovering Public Money in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen (2016), p. 1. Generally speaking, frozen assets can only be returned to the country of origin after the judicial authorities demonstrate the illicit origin of the assets, normally on the basis of information obtained within the framework of mutual legal assistance. There is no structured international process or established body to facilitate asset recovery processes. In the framework of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Asset Recovery was set up in 2006 to provide advice and assistance to the Conference of States Parties. M. Schnebli, “Lessons learned from the past: today’s response from requested countries”, in G. Fenner Zinkernagel, Charles Monteith and Pedro Gomes Pereira, Emerging Trends in Asset Recovery (2013), p. 51. In 2016, following a reconciliation agreement concluded by the Government of Egypt, criminal proceedings against several persons connected with former President Mubarak were dropped. As a consequence, SwF 180 million that were frozen in Switzerland were released without any condition. Proceedings on money-laundering in Switzerland were also precluded. Swiss Confederation, “Arab Spring: Attorney General meets Egyptian authorities in Cairo”, 17 December 2016. A report of the United States Senate showed how financial professionals and institutions were used to bring large amounts of suspect funds into the country to advance their interests. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States: Four Case Histories (2010). Banks are among the biggest facilitators of tax dodging by other corporations. The list of European banks setting up offshore companies is headed by UBS and Credit Suisse. See Oxfam International, Opening the Vaults. The Use of Tax Havens by Europe’s Biggest Banks (2017), p. 8. As the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order observes: “Collusion between the world’s biggest banks, specialized law firms, and consulting and accounting firms has led to a global system designed to hide money and avoid taxes by virtue of secretive offshore structures” (see A/71/286, para. 13).