A/HRC/29/52 commission and to have had implications for the way in which Israeli soldiers on the ground viewed those who remained. On the basis of soldier testimony, one nongovernmental organization concluded that “the soldiers were briefed by their commanders to fire at every person they identified in a combat zone, since the working assumption was that every person in the field was an enemy.” 47 56. The commission recognizes that the general warnings issued by the Israel Defense Forces saved lives. At the same time, these warnings were often used in a context where people fleeing were unable to identify a safe place to go owing to the unpredictability of many attacks over a lengthy period of time. Most importantly, inferring that anyone remaining in an area that has been the object of a warning is an enemy or a person engaging in “terrorist activity”, or issuing instructions to this effect, contributes to creating an environment conducive to attacks against civilians. Those civilians choosing not to heed a warning do not lose the protection granted by their status. The only way in which civilians lose their protection from attack is by directly participating in the hostilities. 48 Merely issuing a warning does not absolve the Israel Defense Forces of their legal obligations to protect civilian life. Protection of civilians, force protection and the “Hannibal directive” (d) 57. An examination of actions by the Israel Defense Forces in Shuja’iya in July and Rafah on 1 August indicates that the protection of Israeli soldiers significantly influenced the conduct of the Israel Defense Forces in these operations, at times overriding any concern for minimizing civilian casualties. While force protection is a legitimate objective, the commission has the distinct impression that, when soldiers’ lives were at stake or there was a risk of capture, the Forces disregarded basic principles on the conduct of hostilities. One of the witnesses recalled that “every time an Israeli soldier dies or is kidnapped, we feel the consequences”. In Rafah, following the killing of two Israeli soldiers and the apparent capture of one, who was later found to be dead, entire areas were closed off, in particular through the use of shelling and air strikes, presumably to prevent the captors from leaving the area with the captive soldier. Reports indicate that a procedure, known as the “Hannibal directive”, was activated in Rafah and possibly in Shuja’iya, where there were similar fears that a soldier had been captured. It reportedly gives considerable leeway to Israeli commanders in deciding how to prevent their soldiers from being captured by armed groups,49 and is widely perceived as having led to intensified shelling. In Rafah, every moving vehicle or person became a potential target, with the most intensive fire reported over the first four hours. 58. The Government of Israel has stated that the requirement to respect the principle of proportionality continues to apply whenever the Hannibal directive is invoked,50 and some have argued that the proportionality test may take into account strategic considerations in determining the military advantage. The commission emphasizes that policy considerations and remote strategic objectives informed by political goals – such as denying armed groups the leverage they could obtain over Israel in negotiations for the release of a captured soldier – are not valid considerations in conducting the proportionality analysis required under international humanitarian law. The commission believes that the military culture created by such policy priorities may have been a factor contributing to the decision to unleash massive firepower in Rafah and Shuja’iya, in utter disregard of its devastating impact on the civilian population. Moreover, applying this protocol in the context of a 47 48 49 50 14 Breaking the Silence, “This is how we fought in Gaza”, May 2015, p. 18. Protocol I, art. 51, para. 3, and art. 57. Breaking the Silence, “This is how we fought in Gaza” (see footnote 49). Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IDF Conduct of Operations (see footnote 17), p. 44.