A/HRC/41/CRP.1 362. US Intelligence Community Directive 191 suggests that the duty to warn may be implemented outside the territory of the United States. Paragraph 9 (f) stipulates that “If the intended victim is located inside the United States or its territories, IC (Intelligence Community) elements should consult with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine how best to communicate threat information to the intended victim.” It can only be inferred from this paragraph (and from the mandate and operations of the CIA) that the CIA duty to warn extends to both US and non-US persons located inside and outside the territories of the United States.302 363. The implementation of a duty to protect extra-territorially raises complex legal and operational questions - opposing the ideal of a universal application of international human rights law to the reluctance of States to assume burdensome obligations303, some of which are beyond the scope of this inquiry and report304. This report will limit its analysis of these questions to the issue at hand: the protection to protect and warn extraterritorially against threats by other States. 364. First, as highlighted by Yuval Shany, whether States can take on the obligation to protect and warn will be context dependent; there is “no one-size- fits-all approach”.305 One key contextual consideration is the nature and extent of the State’s extra-territorial activities, such as the nature of the extent of a State’s Intelligence gathering activities. The Special Rapporteur will not comment about generic and most specific aspects of surveillance carried out by a state except for calling for surveillance to be carried out in accordance with human rights law.306 She emphasizes though that if a State is engaged in such activities directed at specific countries, and comes across information indicating that individuals may be at risk of human rights violations, including violation of the right to life, then it has the obligation to assess the nature and imminence of the risks and threats and to determine how it may protect those whose lives may be at risk. 365. Second, the acts required for effective protection may not necessarily constitute a heavy financial, political or “intelligence” burden. In many circumstances, it may suffice to inform the security agencies of the countries where such individuals are located. For instance, it is unlikely that protecting Mr. Khashoggi while he was in Turkey would have raised particularly difficult concerns. Western Intelligence agencies presumably could have found ways of informing their Turkish counterparts of the existence of a credible and immediate threat against Mr. Khashoggi for them to take action, including by warning him. In May 2019, it was widely reported that the CIA informed the Norwegian Police Security Service, that Palestinian-born Arab Spring activist Illia Baghdadi, residing in Norway, was under credible threats originating from Saudi Arabia. He and others were warned against traveling to specific countries where Saudi Arabia is said to have influence, and were instructed to take a wide range of precautions.307 366. Where cooperating with the Security Agencies of other States is not feasible, intelligence agencies or national authorities may be in a position to inform the States concerned that they are aware of credible risks to specific individuals’ right to life, thus possibly preventing further escalation. 302 303 304 305 306 307 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the United States of America*, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, 23 April 2014, paragraphs 4See Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, principles and Policy, Oxford Monograph in International Law, 2011 Concerns regarding the extra-territorial use of force have been most notably raised with reference to the targeted killing of “terrorists” in the context of international and non-international armed conflicts as well as outside an armed conflict situation. New technologies, and especially unarmed combat aerial vehicles or “drones”, have made it easier to kill targets, with fewer risks to the targeting State. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 Shany, 2013, p.22 See for instance the 2019 report (A/HRC/40/63) on Intelligence Oversight, by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/StatementHRC_40_Privacy.pdf Personal Communication 71