A/HRC/10/3 page 15 44. Several States have devised independent permanent offices, such as inspectors-general, judicial commissioners or auditors, through statutes or administrative arrangements which review whether intelligence agencies comply with their duties. They can act as proactive early warning mechanisms to signal potential problems to the executive, thereby improving accountability. These offices can be required for instance to report at least every six months to the relevant executive bodies on developments and actions of the agencies. To fulfil this function properly such offices must have unrestricted access to all files, premises and personnel of the agency; this is the case for instance in Canada,46 South Africa47 and various countries in Europe. Specialized and continuous supervision has clear merits compared to ad hoc investigations by general supervisory authorities.48 A specific oversight task falls to the national parliament, which in the sphere of intelligence should play its traditional role of holding the executive branch and its agencies accountable to the general public. In practice, there is a diverse range of parliamentary oversight bodies which all have different features, depending on national constitutions and legal traditions. 45. While the Special Rapporteur is aware that it is difficult to identify a universal best practice on this issue, the Norwegian system of parliamentary control is a system that contains at least the elements of best practice as it has an explicit human rights purpose, namely “to ascertain and prevent any exercise of injustice against any person” and to “ensure that activities are kept within the framework of statute law, administrative or military directives and non-statutory law”.49 Furthermore, the parliamentary oversight committee is composed of seven members, who are appointed by Parliament but who don’t necessarily have political affiliations. In this way the committee cannot be abused for party political games, a high level of expertise is guaranteed and the credibility of the expert-members is assured. The members are supported by a secretariat of three lawyers and one secretary who all have security clearance. The members have the power to compel the production of evidence to the committee concerning all matters experienced in the course of their duties. In pursuing its duties, the committee has access to the archives and registers, premises, and installations of all branches of the executive and the intelligence agency. 46. There is a risk that with compartmentalized oversight, whereby oversight bodies are assigned to examine just one part of the intelligence community, cross-cutting problems fall through the gaps between oversight bodies. Oversight bodies with a thematic mandate are therefore generally better equipped to address the increasing overlap of functions, cooperation and the sharing of information between various governmental agencies. The Norwegian 46 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984, section 31 (1) and (2). 47 South Africa’s Intelligence Services Oversight Act 40 of 1994, section 7 (8) (a). 48 See also European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), report on the democratic oversight of the security services, CDL-AD(2007)016, para. 142. 49 Act relating to the Monitoring of Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services, February 1995, section 2.