A/HRC/9/26 page 12 the Military Advocate General, who then decided that “no legal action is to be taken against any military official regarding this incident”.22 According to a press communiqué issued by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the reasons for this decision were that: (a) The shelling of civilians was not intentional; (b) The error was “directly due to a rare and severe failure in the artillery fire-control system operated at the time of the incident” causing “incorrect range findings that lead, unknowingly, to fire at a different target then planned initially”; (c) The malfunction was so rare that “it is not possible to point to a legal circumstantial connection, between the behaviours of the people involved in the incident and the result of the incident”.22 37. Neither the report of the committee nor that of the Advocate General has been made public. The mission requested copies of both on a number of occasions, but these requests remain unanswered. The mission finds this lack of transparency for a process that is in effect to date the only means for accountability for the deaths of 19 civilians, highly disturbing. 38. The Israeli military appears to be of the view that, if an error is caused by malfunctioning technology, there can be no causal link (and thus no responsibility) on the part of individuals, be they designing, building or operating the technology.23 The Mission also notes that press reports of the investigation quote military sources as suggesting that “it would be worthwhile to look into whether the artillery battery team could have nonetheless avoided the incident through more proper performance, and careful monitoring of the equipment”. This proposal is strengthened by the reported recommendations of the investigation, one being to require “human tracking of where shells are falling in addition to the radar”.24 39. According to a number of sources, the Israeli military version of events on 8 November 2006 is as follows. On or at some time prior to 8 November, the military received information that rocket launching would take place from a field near Beit Hanoun. “In an effort to disrupt and thwart the launching of rockets at Israeli population centers”, Israeli artillery directed twenty-four 155 mm shells at two targets near Beit Hanoun. In the military’s view, artillery shelling of a site of potential rocket launching is an effective deterrent. The first 12 shells landed in the correct location, however 6 of the second round landed 450 metres away from their intended target and resulted in the civilian casualties.25 22 Ibid., “Military Advocate General concludes investigation of Beit Hanoun shelling”. 23 The allegedly malfunctioning technology is made by an Israeli manufacturer, which reportedly assisted in the investigation. 24 Haaretz, “Peretz to re-evaluate IDF policy of shelling northern Gaza Strip”, 10 November 2006. 25 Haaretz, “IDF panel: Errant shell in Beit Hanun likely result of human or technical error”, 9 November 2006.