A/HRC/14/27 reflects the link between the Guidelines and the OECD Declaration on International Investment; however, it significantly limits NCPs’ utility as a grievance mechanism for rapidly expanding segments of global value chains. 100. Another weakness is that no minimum performance standards exist for NCPs. Some have made major improvements, while others remain virtually invisible. Their varied caseloads only in part reflect the number of multinationals domiciled in those countries; they also result from marked differences in the receptivity and effectiveness of NCPs. In addition, there are no official consequences to an NCP finding against a company: it could reapply immediately for export or investment assistance from the same government. The Guidelines’ update should address all of these defects. 101. NHRIs and NCPs are two important examples of how non-judicial remedy can contribute to the State duty to protect. Yet neither exists in all States, and they rarely if ever provide full coverage of business-related human rights complaints. Thus, the universe of State-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms remains both under-populated and underresourced. These gaps contribute to the heavy reliance by aggrieved parties and their representatives on campaigns and lawsuits against companies. 102. States may address this deficit by extending the mandates of existing mechanisms or adding complementary ones, drawing on examples of complaints procedures in fair trading, advertising standards or consumer affairs. Whatever roads they choose, States should view the provision of remedy comprehensively so that judicial and non-judicial approaches begin to cohere as a system of remedial options for victims of corporate-related abuse. C. Judicial mechanisms 103. The responsibility for establishing judicial mechanisms, ensuring their functionality and facilitating access to them rests with States. If access to judicial remedy for corporaterelated human rights impacts is to be improved, it is essential that both States and companies act in a manner supportive of the independence and integrity of judicial systems. States that deliberately erect barriers to prevent cases from being brought against business or that obstruct or intimidate the peaceful and legitimate activities of human rights defenders may breach their duty to protect.50 Companies that obstruct or corrupt judicial mechanisms act at variance with their responsibility to respect. 104. Even where such impediments are not at issue, victims of corporate-related human rights abuse may confront legal and practical challenges stemming from the complexity of modern corporate structures coupled with existing imbalances in the operation of judicial systems. 105. First, one legal challenge is the attribution of responsibility among members of a corporate group. Many corporate-related human rights violations also violate existing national civil or criminal law, but applying those provisions to corporate groups can prove extremely complex, even in purely domestic cases. 106. A range of legal arguments has been advanced in cases involving the responsibility of parent companies for harm caused by subsidiaries. Some rely on the parent company’s alleged “negligence” with respect to its subsidiary (primary liability), focusing, for example, on whether the parent has established key systems or processes, like those dealing with hazardous activities. Other arguments invoke “complicity” (secondary liability) or the concept of “agency” (vicarious or third party liability), which are found in both common 50 20 See, for reference, General Assembly resolution 53/144. GE.10-12629