A/HRC/42/CRP.1 conflict had reportedly been denied to NGOs on security grounds. The pressure to move offices from sub-districts put additional burdens on accessing the remaining field locations such as Abs, which requires several hours of driving from Hajjah. Reaching these field locations also reportedly required additional security permits that were sometimes obtained for only a day or two745, further restricting humanitarian organizations’ work. Bureaucratic impediments such as these added to an already limited ability to deliver assistance urgently and respond to needs as they arose. Some humanitarian workers described access limitations in Hajjah over the recent months as unprecedented and the worst they have witnessed in Yemen so far.746 465. An NGO in one of the districts that reported receiving a large flow of internally displaced persons from Hajour told of harassment and arrest of their staff operating in the area, 747 where the NGO was running a mobile clinic. Its staff members were arrested for one day by the Houthis for entering a village without “permission” and accused of working as spies for the coalition. The NGO described to the Group of Experts how access had been increasingly restrained by the Houthis. 466. Various sources spoke to the Group of Experts of the difficulties of dealing with the de facto authorities’ National Authority for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Recovery” (hereinafter “NAMCHA”). Access was reportedly controlled and cleared by National Security, creating an additional layer of complication for NGOs who deal with the NAMCHA as their counterpart, as they are unable to deal directly with national security officials. 748 The Group of Experts gathered reports of pressure by the de facto authorities on organizations to share their data on internally displaced persons and local populations, which some reportedly refused to do. In June 2019, the WFP announced its partial suspension of operations in Yemen, due to diversion of aid by the Houthis. One source interviewed by the Group felt this was a specific concern in Hajjah also. The source indicated that all NGOs and United Nations agencies had been receiving ready-made lists of beneficiaries from the de facto authorities, which does not allow them to provide humanitarian relief on the basis of need. 467. Witnesses who spoke to the Group of Experts said that in March 2019, after the Houthis gained control of Hajour, commercial goods had been allowed to enter but humanitarian organizations continued to be unable to access the area in a sustained and safe manner. Violations 468. Blockades, sieges749 and siege-like warfare are not per se prohibited by international humanitarian law, as long as their purpose is to achieve a military objective and they are not imposed with the aim of starving the civilian population. 750 In any case, the parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, and subject to their right of control.751 469. The access restrictions imposed by the de facto authorities as described above have significantly impeded humanitarian operations, considerably restricting the movement of relief personnel and supplies into or within Hajour. The Group of Experts has reasonable grounds to believe that the de facto authorities have violated their obligation to allow and 745 Confidential Sources on File. Confidential Sources on File. 747 Confidential Sources on File. 748 Confidential Sources on File. 749 The term “siege” is not defined by international law, but can be understood as “the military encirclement of an area with the imposition of restrictions on the entry and exit of essential goods with the aim of forcing its surrender.” See “International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law Relevant to Siege Warfare”, OHCHR, January 2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/sieges_legal_note_-_final_-_en_1.pdf. 750 See Article 14 Additional Protocol II; see also ICRC Study on customary IHL, rule 53. 751 Article 18 Additional Protocol II; see ICRC Study on customary IHL, rule 55. 746 116