A/HRC/42/CRP.1 those individuals within the armed group whose continuous function is to take a direct part in hostilities. Whilst the Guidance has proved controversial in some aspects, it would seem that such individuals would in any event have lost their civilian protection as taking a direct part in hostilities. 65. In contemporary conflicts, particularly where there is a significant asymmetry of military resources, it is not uncommon for fighters to try to blend in with the civilian population. This can make it difficult in practice for the opponent to distinguish between fighters and protected civilians. Such genuine difficulties must be distinguished from the situation where the State assumes that all civilians support the fighters and act accordingly. Members of the civilian population, as opposed to members of armed groups, only lose protection if they participate directly in the fighting and only lose protection for such time as that participation lasts. 66. If civilians work within a military installation, such as a munitions factory, they do not lose their status as civilians but bear the risks attendant upon working in such a location. 67. Whilst a presumption exists in treaty law, at least in IAC, that a person is a civilian, that does not appear to be the case in customary law32. It would appear therefore that a decision has to be made, in good faith, on a case-by-case basis. It is certainly not the case that a person can be presumed to be a fighter. Objects 68. Whilst the rules are slightly clearer in the case of objects, their application is not without difficulty. In order to be potentially subject to attack, an object must be a military objective.33 Any object which is not a military objective is a civilian object and cannot be the subject of attack.34 If an object which is normally a civilian object is used for military purposes, it may become a military objective. 69. In order to constitute a military objective, the object must satisfy a two-pronged test. It must by its nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and its destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time must offer a definite military advantage.35 The same rule applies in both IAC and NIAC. Whilst the formulation of the rule appears to be generally accepted, the United States of America appears to interpret the concepts of contribution and military advantage more broadly than many other States, so as to include activities and assets which contribute in non-military ways to sustaining the war fighting capability.36 The broader definition is likely to extend the range of economic targets regarded as lawful objectives. Even so, it would appear only to cover economic activities which make a real contribution to the enemy’s capacity to fight, rather than all economic activities occurring in its territory. 37 It is not clear whether the broader approach would also apply to non-economic targets, such as objects which are used to rally support for the State. 38 32 See generally ICRC Study on customary IHL, rule 6. An object is not limited to things such as buildings and vehicles. It can, for example, include an area of land. 34 ICRC Study on customary IHL, rule 7. 35 ICRC Study on customary IHL, rule 8. 36 Department of Defense Law of War Manual (as amended) 5.6.6.2 (previously 5.7.6.2) 37 The sale of oil or gas, for example, would contribute materially to the national exchequer but a small factory in private ownership producing medicines and other pharmaceutical products would not appear to do so, even if some of the products were exported. 38 For example, a radio or television station which is not used to relay messages to the armed forces but whose programmes are used generally to encourage support for the government. Propaganda was recognised as a normal governmental activity in the trial of Fritsche; Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 41 AJIL (1947), p.172 at p.328. Following the NATO campaign over Kosovo, the Prosecutor of the ICTY set up a group to examine the lawfulness of certain incidents. In the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Committee said, at para. 76, “If, however, the attack was made …. because the station was part of the propaganda machinery, the legal 33 17