A/HRC/42/CRP.1 the Group of Arab States including Egypt, advised the Group of Experts that they would not cooperate with it or support its work. 91. While the secretariat retained some informal contact with the Government of Yemen, the inability to physically access Yemen in 2019, due entirely to non-cooperation by the coalition and Government of Yemen, affected the work of the Group of Experts. The Group of Experts further reiterates that, though it found methods to overcome the obstacles created by the non-cooperation of parties, it became apparent that some of the parties were deliberately attempting to obstruct the work of the Group. V. Context, background, and update on the political situation 92. While a detailed discussion of Yemeni political history is beyond the scope of this report, a brief review of the depth and breadth of the roots of the current conflict is undertaken in order to establish the context from which it arose, as well as to explain the background of the different actors involved in the armed conflict whose alliances continue to shift. This is followed by a review of the events related to the armed conflict in Yemen during the period covered by the current mandate of the Group of Experts: September 2014 to June 2019. A. Precursors to the current armed conflict 93. After years of internal conflict, north and south Yemen were united in 1990. The 1990 agreement combined the northern Yemen Arab Republic and southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen under the unified interim presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the incumbent leader from the north. The agreement was premised on a temporary north-south power-sharing agreement with southern leader Ali Salem al-Beidh installed as interim vice president. 94. The first Republic of Yemen parliamentary elections were held in 1993. President Saleh’s General People’s Congress (hereinafter “GPC”) obtained the majority of seats, followed by the northern al-Islah Party and the southern Yemeni Socialist Party (hereinafter “YSP”).70 President Saleh, Vice-President al-Beidh, and Prime Minister Haidar al-‘Attas retained their positions. Al-‘Attas formed a coalition government between the GPC and YSP; Al-Islah and the GPC formed a united parliamentary bloc. 95. In late 1993 to early 1994, the relationship between the President and Vice-President broke down as southerners felt they were being marginalised. Conflict broke out between northern and southern armies, leading to a declaration of secession by the south in May,71 followed by intense fighting which ended with Saleh’s northern forces taking control of Aden in July.72 96. After the war President Saleh appointed Abd-Rabo Mansour Hadi, from the southern governorate of Abyan, as Vice-President. Amendments to the constitution in 1994 expanded President Saleh’s executive power.73 The north-south power struggle continued. 97. Southern discontent with the centralisation of power in Sana’a after the 1994 civil war was further exacerbated by redistribution of southern land to Saleh supporters, forced retirement of southern military and security officers, as well as diplomats and civil servants, and the perception that the newly discovered southern oil resources were being stolen by 70 For analysis of the 1993 Yemen parliamentary elections, see e.g. http://www.aiys.org/no-331993/156-campaign-politics-and-coalition-building-the-1993-parliamentary-elections.html 71 Southern leaders declared the south to be the Democratic Republic of Yemen on 21 May 1994; however, it failed to gain international recognition. 72 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen: Stemming the Rise of a Chaos State”, Chatham House Research Paper, May 2016, p. 8. 73 Ibid; Constitution of the Republic of Yemen (as amended on 29 September 1994), available at: http://www.track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/Yemen/Laws/Constitution%20(1994)%20( ENG).pdf. 23