A/HRC/42/CRP.1 broadcast about the raid stating that “the time had come” for al-Islah, that no headquarters would be spared, and that they would pursue al-Islah relentlessly.358 260. Between 10 October 2017 and 23 October 2018, a dramatic escalation in assassinations of religious leaders and al-Islah influencers occurred. This escalated significantly in September and October 2018 before stopping abruptly. In total, out of 35 victims, 20 were religious leaders or influential persons affiliated to al-Islah. On 18 October 2017, Fahad al-Yunisi, the imam singled-out by Hani Bin Breik, was killed. Reportedly, the Security Department in Aden issued a statement on 19 October 2017 denying Hani Bin Breik’s involvement, but stating that he met al-Yunisi in the days prior to his killing and asked him to leave the al-Islah-supported charitable association, which he refused to do.359 (b) Analysis 261. There are common factors that underpin these 20 cases involving religious leaders, together with the eight previous cases in 2016, the killing of an atheist leader in 2017, and nine of the 10 cases investigated by the Group. Firstly, all of these victims were key influencers in their community, able to motivate people and dictate public opinion. Secondly, they were openly critical of or not in agreement with the United Arab Emirates, Southern Transitional Council and/or Security Belt, and were well-known as such through their affiliations or through public statements prior to their death. 262. Eight of the 10 cases investigated by the Group were religious leaders or influential persons affiliated to al-Islah. Three of these victims were linked through their positions at mosques, and educational, charitable or religious institutions.360 Five were linked to other reported victims of assassinations in the same way, including successors of the institutions they led. In the case of an atheist leader, his associates were later targeted as well. 361 There are reports of other similar linked cases, such as those of al-Islah Imam and schoolteacher Shawki Mohammed Moqbel al-Kamadi, and Imam and journalist Safwan Sharjabi in May 2018.362 Notably, in three cases investigated, imams who were eliminated were replaced by imams who were not critical of the United Arab Emirates, Southern Transitional Council or Security Belt.363 263. Of the 28 reported assassinations of religious leaders, 16 were killed in the alMansoura district of Aden. All of these victims were known as Salafis, or members or supporters of al-Islah. The majority of the 28 were killed in shootings by perpetrators using vehicles. The perpetrators concealed their identity and in some instances used silenced weapons. All 28 reported cases and all 10 of the cases investigated occurred in territory controlled by Security Belt. In five of the 10 investigated cases, individual perpetrators were identified by witnesses as part of Security Belt or United Arab Emirates forces. 364 In four others, the assassination partially or fully occurred in the vicinity of or within the line of sight of Security Belt posts.365 264. On three occasions during 2017-2018, United Arab Emirates officers approached detainees in the al-Bureiqa coalition base facility who were former Security Belt or Resistance fighters and asked them to become assassins. When they refused to do so United Arab Emirates personnel attempted to coerce them with prolonged detention and torture, including sexual violence.366 358 Comprehensive Report on File. Comprehensive Report on File. 360 Confidential Sources on File. 361 Confidential Sources on File. 362 Confidential Sources on File. Also see https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/whois-killing-yemens-clerics-mystery-murders-are-sending-a-chill-through-themosques/2018/08/27/10b7da3c-ce0f-49e2-ad8e-d4adf05ef885_story.html?noredirect=on 363 Confidential Sources on File. 364 Confidential Sources on File. 365 Confidential Sources on File. 366 Confidential Sources on File. 359 62