A/HRC/36/44 form of protests, domestic blocking legislation, non-recognition by domestic courts etc. The study would also have to assess the potential implications of the use of extraterritorial sanctions in terms of the law of international responsibility. It is worth mentioning in that respect that, in 2006, the International Law Commission examined a preliminary Secretariat report on extraterritorial jurisdiction, which could form the basis for long-term work on the codification of international law on the matter.17 That proposal could (or should) be revived in some form. 2. International human rights law 27. The adverse effects of international coercive measures in general on the enjoyment of human rights of targeted populations have been widely documented. The question arises whether extraterritorial sanctions display specific features (i.e. whether they are likely to have specific adverse consequences on human rights) that can be distinguished from those arising from the use of sanctions in general. It is submitted that such specific effects flow from extraterritorial sanctions, to the extent that they affect the ability of the targeted country (and its population), as well as that of third countries not involved in the dispute between source and target countries, to interact with the global business and financial community. They are likely, per se, to have specific, additional adverse consequences on human rights, including the right to development. Most international businesses, while legally not subject to the jurisdiction of the targeting State, will in practice be unwilling to entertain any economic relations with parties in the targeted State that might lead to their “violating” the provisions of the extraterritorial sanctions regime — and thus might jeopardize their ability to pursue their own business activities in the targeting State. This has led to the damaging practice of over-compliance by trading partners of targeted countries. The result is a de facto blockade of the target State, voluntarily complied with by economic actors that are not even legally subject to the jurisdiction of the targeting State. The distinct additional impact of extraterritorial sanctions may also be related to their effects on the targeted State’s ability to gain access to international financial institutions, foreign financial markets and international aid. 28. As an example, the impact of the extraterritorial sanctions imposed on Cuba by the United States (before their lifting, de jure rather than de facto, in 2016) on the country’s ability to conduct commerce with the outside world and access international financial markets has been described as amounting de facto to a global embargo. The Helms-Burton Act had the effect of blocking access by Cuba to global financial institutions, as well as to access to the SWIFT financial messaging system, which had severe effects in the context of the economic crisis of Cuba.18 29. Extraterritorial application of unilateral sanctions may also have an adverse impact on the enjoyment of human rights in third countries, which are not targeted directly, but are prevented by the operation of the (extraterritorial) foreign law from entertaining economic relations with the target country. It has long been recognized that economic sanctions enacted against States by the Security Council may cause unintended adverse consequences for third parties, such as trade partners. Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that, if preventive or enforcement measures against any State are taken by the Security Council, any other State that finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures has the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems. 30. It is fair to assume that the same adverse effects may derive from the application of unilateral (extraterritorial) sanctions, but in that situation no rule comparable to Article 50 of the Charter seems to apply. 31. Regulation No. 2271/96 of the Council of the European Union (the “blocking statute”) was intended to address and remedy the adverse effects of foreign extraterritorial sanctions on economic enterprises of the European Union engaging in international trade 17 18 8 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10). C.J. Gordon, “The U.S. Embargo against Cuba and the Diplomatic Challenges to Extraterritoriality”, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 36 (2012), pp. 69-70.