A/HRC/36/44 and/or the movement of capital and related commercial activities between the (then) European Community and (targeted) third countries. 19 The protection against the extraterritorial application of sanctions lies in particular in the mandatory non-recognition in the European Union of their legal effects. 20 It is to be noted that, while economic operators in the European Union are generally prohibited from complying in any way with the extraterritorial sanctions,21 they can nevertheless seek authorization to comply fully or partially to the extent that non-compliance would seriously damage their interests or those of the Community. 22 Interestingly, the instrument also provides in detail for remedies in favour of affected persons. European Union enterprises engaged in trade or economic relations with a target country are to be entitled to recover any damages, including legal costs, caused to that person by the application of the extraterritorial laws. Such recovery may be obtained from the natural or legal person or any other entity causing the damages or from any person acting on its behalf or intermediary. The recovery could take the form of seizure and sale of assets held by those persons, entities, persons acting on their behalf or intermediaries within the European Union, including shares held in a legal person incorporated within the European Union. 23 32. It is probably fair to note that, although the blocking statute appears at first sight to be a powerful tool enabling the European Union to protect itself against the effects of extraterritorial sanctions, it has unfortunately failed in the past to protect some European Union companies (including banks), which incurred huge penalties from the United States Department of the Treasury on the grounds of non-compliance with United States sanctions. It is disturbing to observe that the European Union and its member States have generally refrained from enforcing the provisions of the blocking statute or from exercising any form of diplomatic protection in favour of their nationals affected by the extraterritorial effects of foreign sanctions. Further, it is noteworthy that the application of this instrument has not been extended by the European Union to cover the most recent United States sanctions regimes having extraterritorial reach. B. Extraterritorial obligations of States in relation to sanctions 33. The question is still being debated whether the obligations of States under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights extend extraterritorially “to the point at which a State imposing sanctions might be held responsible for any consequential deprivation (of the right to food or health care, for example), even if the sanctioning State exercised no formal jurisdiction or control over the population concerned”.24 However, the Special Rapporteur wishes to emphasize that there are strong and convergent legal arguments pointing to the existence of extraterritorial State obligations under the Covenant that may cover situations of imposition of international sanctions. As it has been observed, “it is now widely agreed that human rights treaties may, in principle, impose on States parties obligations not only when they adopt measures applicable on their own territory, but also extraterritorial obligations, which may include positive obligations going insofar as the State can influence situations located abroad”.25 It seems difficult to deny that sanctions come within the category of situations where States can influence situations located abroad.26 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96, art. 1. Ibid., art. 4. Ibid., art. 5. Ibid., art. 5. Ibid., art. 6. M. Craven, “The violence of dispossession: extra-territoriality and economic, social, and cultural rights”, in M. Baderin and R. McCorquodale, eds., Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 71. O. De Schutter, “A human rights approach to trade and investment policies”, November 2008, para. 3.2. Available from www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/451_2_104504.pdf. Ibid. 9