A/HRC/42/49 4. Security questions 76. A number of armed rebel groups in neighbouring countries have stated that they might resort to force to resolve the situation in Burundi. They could be encouraged to do so by the unlikelihood of a resolution to the crisis. Some refugees may also join armed groups, especially since there are Imbonerakure in some camps, a circumstance that causes them to feel insecure. The ability of armed groups to conduct large-scale operations in Burundi remains unknown. At the same time, Burundi regularly accuses Rwanda of seeking to destabilize it and of forcibly detaining Burundian refugees. 77. In Burundi, the situation of the army, a stabilizing influence since the Arusha Agreement, has become fluid. It has long enjoyed privileged economic and social standing. The attempted coup d’état in May 2015 exposed the existence of dissent in the army, which is now partly under surveillance. There have been purges in the form of arrests and physical eliminations. Compliance with the requirement for ethnic balance set out in the Constitution seems to be a thing of the past. There is also fatigue and a degree of mistrust in the army, particularly because of the threat to lucrative peace-mission deployments 78. The National Intelligence Service, which answers directly to the Office of the President, is no longer an official part of the defence and security forces and is therefore no longer subject to parliamentary oversight or ethnic quotas. This reorganization of the security apparatus is troubling. 79. The Joint Human Security Committees, in place at all levels since 2014 and with extremely vague mandates, are controlled by local administrative authorities loyal to the ruling party and by Imbonerakure. Imbonerakure have supplanted the police in all security issues and politicized those issues. They are conducting more and more night rounds in the hills and mass sports training sessions, often with a paramilitary dimension, which worries and intimidates part of the population. Members of the security and defence forces have been targeted in incidents that have taken place since early 2019, although the persons responsible have not been identified. C. Risk indicators 80. This brief review of the most significant developments makes it possible to identify indicators that are themselves linked to eight common risk factors identified in the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes. 81. Insecurity creates an environment that is conducive to atrocity crimes (risk factor 1). The existence of such an environment is suggested by the following indicators: many Burundians, both in the country and abroad, are living through a humanitarian emergency (risk factor 1 (c)); the transfer of power of 2015 triggered a major political crisis that has not yet been resolved (risk factor 1 (d)); there is a risk of political instability caused by probable power struggles within CNDD-FDD and by the existence of armed opposition movements (risk factor 1 (e)); political tension is being generated by an autocratic regime that engages in severe political repression of all its opponents, real or perceived (risk factor 1 (f)); there is economic instability caused by scarcity of resources (risk factor 1 (g)), a severe crisis in the national economy (risk factor 1 (h)) and the acute poverty of the population (risk factor 1 (i)). 82. Risk factor 2 is related to a history of serious human rights violations that, because they have not been prevented or punished, create a risk of further violations. The presence of this risk factor is revealed by the following indicators: past or present serious human rights violations (risk factor 2 (a)); acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes that have marked the country’s recent history (risk factor 2 (b)); a policy or practice of impunity for or tolerance of serious human rights violations (risk factor 2 (c)); the refusal or reluctance of the Government of Burundi to use all possible means to put an end to serious human rights violations (risk factor 2 (d)); the continuation of support by the Burundian authorities for groups accused of involvement in violations and the failure to condemn their actions (risk factor 2 (e)); the Government’s refusal to acknowledge serious human rights violations or its biased accounts thereof (risk factor 2 (f)); the absence of GE.19-13419 15