A/HRC/9/7 page 17 59. The responses did not provide sufficient information to draw any common elements. Information is also insufficient to determine how the concept of defamation and related ideas are interpreted and applied, or if they reflect international normative standards. G. Caution about defamation of religions 60. Some of the responses raised concerns about the concept of defamation of religions and caution against its adoption as an international normative notion. For example, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty submitted that the concept of defamation of religions is not recognized in international human rights law and that it would be inconsistent with the foundation of international human rights law. The Becket Fund stated that the concept of defamation as recognized in national laws is designed to protect against harm to reputation with adverse consequences. As applied in national laws, the concept of defamation strikes a balance with freedom of expression and, in many legal systems, there are reasonably well-defined criteria and an extensive jurisprudence on relevant issues, such as what is regarded as defamatory information, harm to reputation and the element of truth as a defence. These criteria could not be equally applicable to a concept of defamation of religions that would protect ideas, as this would be contrary to the notion of freedom of religion or belief. 61. Some of the critics also noted that terms such as contempt, interference with conscience, outrage and ridicule that are sometimes used interchangeably or synonymously with defamation of religions are too vague and imprecise and, therefore, potentially give unbridled, subjective power to the State to constrain critical, unpopular or disfavoured speech and views. They also pointed out that it would entail the interpretation and some process of ranking of religious texts and of religions in order to determine the truthfulness of a purportedly defamatory statement or view. This would be contrary to the notion of freedom of religion as understood in international human rights law, which includes the freedom not to believe, and raises the risk of discrimination in favour of State-preferred religions. 62. The Council of Europe also cited a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, which made the point that those who manifest religion could not expect to be exempt from criticism and must “tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrine hostile to their faith”. IV. CONCLUSIONS 63. The sample of the replies presented in the present report is too limited and not sufficiently detailed for conclusions to be drawn about the status of laws related to the implementation of Council Resolution 7/19. Nevertheless, the examples provide some indication of the range of laws related to the protection of freedom of religion, as well as of potential constraints. 64. Most of the replies reflected concern that there is a growing trend towards the negative portrayal of religion in the media and in political discourse, and policies and practices that seem targeted at people because of their religion.