A/HRC/7/12 page 8 20. The policies seem to be taking place both at the regional and bilateral levels. For example, there have been reports that some Southern European States have intensified border controls and have attempted to externalize migration control policies by pressuring West and North African countries to prevent irregular migration and to sign readmission agreements in exchange for aid, financial support and work permits. There have also been reports of certain immigration controls which are being imposed to restrict northward migration from Mexico and countries in Central America through the United States-Mexico border, including those imposed by States in the region which serve as countries of transit. In this regard, the phenomenon of transnational gang networks, and the complex financing and law enforcement agreements used to combat them, are a particular challenge.12 21. These migration control policies have also had a series of unintended side effects in the form of increasing violations of migrants’ rights in the region. Moreover, they have led to a diversification of trans-Saharan migration routes and attempted sea crossing-points (e.g. through Cape Verde and the Canary Islands), which now cover large stretches of the African coastline from Guinea to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.13 Organized crime networks involved in the smuggling of migrants into the United States have been similarly problematic as smugglers adjust their routes and increase the complexity of their efforts to account for the ever-increasing restrictions. There are persistent accounts of the dangers confronted by would-be migrants in transit in both of these regions, as well as in others, as increased measures in terms of infrastructure and surveillance may induce irregular migrants to take greater risks in circumventing the authorities.14 The Special Rapporteur remains concerned about the number of deaths occurring throughout the migration process. 22. In addition, there has been discussion about the effectiveness of such policies, which may have had unintended, perhaps even counterproductive, effects. For example, although many migrants are intercepted, detained and expelled in the process, satisfying the goal of preventing irregular migration, expulsion may not necessarily be a deterrent for future migration attempts as intended because migrants may try again through other avenues. There are cases of migrants who had planned to remain in the country of first destination15 but subsequently decide to continue on 12 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Central America and Mexico gang assessment”, April 2006. 13 Haas, pp. 52-54; Aderanti Adepoju, “Creating a borderless West Africa: Constraints and Prospects for Intra-Regional Migration”, draft article of the “Migration without Borders” series, UNESCO, 1 January 2005, UNESCO, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/ 0013/001391/139142e.pdf. 14 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-770 Illegal Immigration: Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995, August 2006, http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d06770.pdf and BBC News, “Canaries migrant death toll soars”, 28 December 2006 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6213495.stm). 15 Often this is reflected in intraregional movement.