A/HRC/45/CRP.4 agreement maintain that the current Parliament lacks the legal authority to conduct Transitional Period legislative functions outlined in the R-ARCSS, including to enact legislation to create the HCSS, CTRH, and CRA.18 31. While the Government of South Sudan has publicly pledged to support the establishment of the CTRH, it has not committed the required resources to make it operational. A technical committee created in 2017 to support sensitisation activities and raise awareness about the CTRH conducted limited consultations across the country with minimal impact, leaving questions open about the timing, relevance, and credibility of the process. The Commission is of the view that all South Sudanese civilians should be able to participate freely in processes for establishing truth, understanding the causes of conflict, and promoting reconciliation and healing. If the country is still in conflict, and significant numbers of citizens remain displaced internally and abroad, the prevailing consensus is that this would be difficult to achieve, but should not prevent the establishment of these mechanisms, whose reach and activities can be extended incrementally during the implementation phase. Any preparations for the establishment of the CTRH, particularly consultations, should bear these realities in mind.19 32. Since 2017, the African Union-led negotiations with the Incumbent-TGoNU to set up the HCSS pursuant to the R-ARCSS have seemingly led to a deadlock. The AU sought the cooperation of the Government of South Sudan in operationalising the Hybrid Court, including to prepare the draft Statute and determine the location, funding, infrastructure, and appointment of personnel to the Court. However, the resulting Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of South Sudan and the AU and the Statute to create the Court are yet to be signed. The national-level legislation required to establish the Hybrid Court is also yet to be passed in parliament. 33. The establishment of the broadly constituted R-TGoNU is an opportunity for the African Union to renew this conversation with the new government. When they previously spoke to the Commission, certain sources within the Incumbent-TGoNU had intimated that the HCSS lacked support from some political elites within the Government who were wary of coming within the Court’s jurisdiction.20 Some officials have repeatedly insinuated that South Sudan would prefer to pursue a mediated peace, truth, and reconciliation process, rather than criminal accountability for conflict-related violations, which, they fear, would undermine the peace process.21 This position was reinforced by the public disclosure in April 2019 that the Government had entered into a multi-million dollar contract with a US lobbying firm, explicitly to “delay and ultimately block establishment of the hybrid court envisaged in the R-ARCISS.” The contract was later amended.22 34. The Government of South Sudan has thus far paid little to no attention to the CRA, due to its position that the CRA will have major financial implications. This could be connected to President Kiir’s reservations about the CRA at the time of the signing of the ARCSS in August 2015; he argued that resources should instead be channelled towards “the reconstruction of infrastructure and rebuilding of livelihoods of communities in the States most affected by the conflict.”23 The Commission notes that while every citizen is entitled to benefit from development, it should not be a substitute for tailored reparations, which involve specific acknowledgement of the experiences of the recipients and are linked to accountability mechanisms. 35. While the on-going humanitarian crisis, delays in demilitarisation within civilian sites and the unification of armed forces, and renewed armed hostilities and internecine violence 18 Confidential Meetings, 8 and 11 June 2020. See additional details provided in the annexed transitional justice workshop report (Annex I). 20 Confidential Meeting, 2 June 2020. ERN D121400 – D121401; see also https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1S60Q6OZATP. 21 Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan: Conference on Transitional Justice and Promotion of Peace in South Sudan, Addis Ababa, 17 December 2019. 22 See https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6667-Exhibit-AB-20190418-2.pdf; and https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/30/south-sudanscynical-bid-block-war-crimes-court; and https://www.voanews.com/archive/critics-slam-multimillion-dollar-deal-between-southsudan-us-based-lobbying-firm. 23 The Reservations of the Government on the IGAD Plus Compromise Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 2015, available at https://carleton.ca/africanstudies/wp-content/uploads/GRSS-reservations.pdf. 19 8