A/HRC/44/47/Add.1 and judges of interdistrict, district and city courts). Until recently, the Council exercised this competence in consultation with the President (article 63, paragraph 5, of the Law on Courts), but such consultative process has now been eliminated.11 40. The Supreme Judicial Council also participates in the selection of Chairs and deputy Chairs of military courts, regional courts and Tashkent city courts, who are appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Council. 41. The Council does not play any role in the selection of the most senior judges – that is, Chairs, deputy Chairs and judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court – who are elected by the Senate on the proposal of the President. 42. In relation to the procedure for the selection and appointment of judges, the mandate has consistently held that this procedure should be based on objective criteria previously established by law, and that decisions concerning the selection should be based solely on merit, with regard to the qualifications, skills and capacities of the candidates, as well as to their integrity, independence and impartiality.12 In this regard, the Special Rapporteur regrets that neither the criteria nor the procedure envisaged for the selection of candidates provide sufficient guarantees to avoid judicial appointments based on improper motives. 43. Most of the criteria set out in the Law establishing the Council for selecting candidates to judicial offices are too broad or generic, and the law does not provide any guidance on how to assess some of the requirements, such as spotless reputation, honesty or sufficient life experience (arts. 20 and 21). This means that in practice, candidates for judicial offices are currently selected on the basis of formal and overly general requirements that do not allow a proper assessment of the moral integrity, independence and professional qualifications of the candidate. 44. The procedure envisaged by the Law with regard to the selection of candidates is extremely cumbersome. In the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, the selection procedure could be made more straightforward by organizing regular competitive selection processes and appointing successful candidates on the basis of their rating in that process. Competitive examinations conducted, at least partly, in a written and anonymous manner represent an important tool in the selection process.13 Mandatory training, including an internship in court, could be provided only to candidates who had been successful in the selection process. 4. Security of tenure 45. Security of tenure constitutes an essential guarantee for ensuring the independence of the judiciary. While not all international standards unambiguously state that judges should be appointed for life, it is undeniable that judges who do not have long-term security of tenure may be subject to undue pressure and interferences from different actors, such as the executive branch, the judicial hierarchy or other appointing authorities. This problem becomes particularly acute in countries where the executive branch plays a predominant role in the selection and appointment of judges. 46. Law No. 428 of 12 April 2017 introduced amendments to article 63-1 of the Law on Courts, which regulates security of tenure. According to this new provision, judges are now appointed for an initial 5-year term, followed by a 10-year term, and subsequently by a lifetime appointment. These changes represent a positive step in the right direction. However, the system of two temporary appointments before achieving a lifelong appointment continues to expose judges to the risks of undue pressure and interferences during the first 15 years in office. This is true, in particular, for judges dealing with politically sensitive cases, who may feel pressured to decide in favour of the State authorities in order to improve their chances of being reappointed. 11 12 13 See Law No. ZRU-566 of 10 September 2019. A/HRC/38/38, para. 49. Ibid., para. 54; A/HRC/11/41, para. 30. 9