A/HRC/45/45/Add.1 trustworthy.11 The scarce demand for accountability in a country, like Sri Lanka, with a history of repeated violations, is perhaps the strongest indication of their lack of success. 37. The commissions have generally been criticized, to varying extents, for their lack of independence, manipulation of evidence, inadequate access or linguistic incompetence, and questionable guarantees for participants, given the absence of a witness protection programme.12 The cumulative effect of these commissions has been to increase mistrust in the Government’s determination to genuinely redress violations. At this critical juncture, the country cannot afford to simply reproduce an approach characterized by the proliferation of largely unrelated and inconsequential ad hoc initiatives. 38. A non-exhaustive list of commissions would include: (a) The Sansoni Commission, which investigated the violence that took place in August and September 1977; (b) The Presidential commissions inquiring into the involuntary removal of persons during 1991–1993;13 (c) The three “zonal” commissions of inquiry into disappearances that took place in three different areas of the country in 1994, which received 27,526 complaints and determined that, of those they had time to examine, 16,800 amounted to enforced disappearances, many victims of which involved minors and youths. The commissions reported on the victimization of women, the involvement of government officials and senior politicians in the violations and the existence of evidence indicative of the identities of several perpetrators, and advocated for prosecutions;14 (d) The 1998 “all-island” disappearances commission, which was tasked with completing the work that the “zonal” commissions had not been able to conclude and which recorded 10,400 more cases of disappearance; (e) 16 cases;15 The Udalagama Commission, which was established in 2006 to investigate (f) The 2010 Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission, which was established to look into the failure of the 2002 ceasefire agreement and subsequent events until 19 May 2009, determine responsibilities and make recommendations on restitution and institutional reforms to guarantee non-recurrence;16 11 12 13 14 15 16 This view is supported by national and international organizations. The Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms has reported on the widespread criticisms voiced by the victims of the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission and Panaragama Commission. See also www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/48000/asa370052009eng.pdf and www.icj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/ICJ-Srilanka-Report.pdf. Through the Assistance to and Protection of Victims of Crime and Witnesses Act (Act No. 4 of 2015), a national authority and a police department division for the protection of victims and witnesses were established. The design of the institution was criticized nationally and internationally. See, e.g., http://war-victims-map.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CTF-Final-Report-Volume-I-Nov-16.pdf. By the time these commissions had been established, the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances had already received almost 15,000 Sri Lankan cases and transmitted almost 5,000 to the Government. Interim Reports of the Commission of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons in the Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces (Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka, 1997). The commission was “accompanied” by a 12-member international independent group of eminent persons that resigned in protest in 2008. The commission only issued reports on 7 of the 16 cases assigned to it. See https://sitesatrisksl.wordpress.com/2016/05/11/secretariat-for-coordinatingreconciliation-mechanisms/amp/?__twitter_impression=true. Report of the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (November 2011), pp.5 ff. See https://sitesatrisksl.wordpress.com/2016/05/11/secretariat-for-coordinating-reconciliationmechanisms/amp/?__twitter_impression=true. 7