A/HRC/45/45/Add.1 Lanka, together with the full support of the armed forces, which stand to gain from this process, to establish a robust, credible and comprehensive transitional justice policy. A. General recommendations 85. Nothing has hindered the transitional justice programme in Sri Lanka more than lack of commitment on the part of the Government, which was not only slow in terms of design and implementation, but which wavered in its messaging and ultimately has failed up to this point to take full ownership of the process. Sri Lanka has a long history of partial compliance with its human rights obligations, which is not actually a form of compliance but, ultimately, one of non-compliance. Breaking out of this pattern means making unambiguous commitments, expressed both in words and in deeds, starting with the President and the Prime Minister, and making the case for a comprehensive human rights-based and gender-sensitive redress and prevention policy that integrates measures to satisfy victims’ rights to truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. 86. On this basis, the Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government: (a) Develop a comprehensive transitional justice strategy that includes a clear timeline for the establishment of the different transitional justice mechanisms, identifies needs regarding budget, staff and required expertise and outlines the links between the different elements of the strategy. Moreover, the Government should allow the public to engage in consultations in the development of the strategy and seek, in particular, the views of women, given the differential impact that violations and the conflict have had on them and children; (b) Take greater advantage of the report of the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms. In its report, the Task Force identifies expectations, needs, challenges and priorities as expressed by key stakeholders and provides information that could be invaluable to the Government’s efforts to align its intentions with the needs of victims. The network that the Task Force put in place in 2016 could prove very useful for continuing the dialogue and holding consultations on the design and implementation of reconciliation mechanisms; (c) Tap more into the expertise that could be provided by OHCHR. So far, Sri Lanka has regrettably underutilized the support offered by the United Nations; (d) Take greater advantage of its Human Rights Commission during the entire process of drafting legislation. The Government must commit itself to providing the Commission with sufficient resources to carry out its crucial functions and to takings its views and recommendations seriously. B. Recommendations for building trust in the Government’s commitment and capacity to move forward with reforms 87. Since one of the aims of transitional justice is to foster trust, the Government should consider other confidence-building measures. For example, the Government should: (a) Repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act and promptly replace it with new counter-terrorism legislation that adheres to international best practices. It should also promptly deal with long-standing cases pending under the Act and put in place a procedure to review convictions handed down under the Act that were based solely on the confession of the accused; (b) Cease the continued harassment and surveillance by security and intelligence personnel of human rights defenders and other social actors, especially women; (c) Carry out a comprehensive mapping of land occupied by the military and land recently released; produce a strategy with deadlines for restitution and plans for compensating former landowners whose land will not be returned; consider 16