A/HRC/21/37 19. Concerns have been expressed that judicial investigations into human rights violations committed in the wake of the unrest in 2011 remained selective and lacked credibility. As a result, most victims have refused to cooperate. The members of the delegation were briefed by the Prosecutor General about the progress of the few emblematic cases being prosecuted: the grenade attack on demonstrators in Ta’izz, on 17 February 2011; the sniper attack on Change Square in Sanaa, on 18 March; the forcible evacuation and burning of Freedom Square in Ta’izz, on 29 May; and, as a case clearly distinct from the violence against protesters, the bomb attack of 3 June on the Presidential mosque, which targeted former President Saleh and his associates. The Prosecutor General confirmed that investigations were progressing with regard to the events of 18 March and the Presidential mosque incidents; 14 people, mostly military personnel, were in detention in connection with the first incident, while and 28 others (20 military personnel and eight civilians) were awaiting trial at the Political Security prison in connection with the attack on the Presidential mosque. The delegation met with some of the presidential mosque detainees and heard complaints of torture at the hands of those who arrested them, apparently members of the Presidential Guard National Security or of the Criminal Investigation Police. A verdict in absentia against the three suspected perpetrators of the Ta’izz grenade attack was reached at the end of June, with all three sentenced to death. The delegation expresses its concern as to whether all international human rights standards, including fair trial guarantees for those facing the death penalty, were respected. 20. Lawyers interviewed by the delegation expressed their dissatisfaction at the way investigations were conducted in both the cases of 18 March and the presidential mosque attack, claiming that the real perpetrators were not those in detention, and called for fresh investigations also in the other cases of use of excessive force against protesters or extrajudicial executions in Sanaa, Ta’izz, Aden and elsewhere. The necessity of carrying out independent and impartial investigations into all human rights violations committed during the events 2011 was highlighted by a wide range of people, including families of victims, human rights groups and various political leaders and activists. 21. In her report on the OHCHR assessment mission to Yemen, the High Commissioner recommended that the Government of Yemen launch transparent and independent investigations, compliant with international standards, into any credible allegations of serious human rights violations committed by Government security forces during the events of 2011 (A/HRC/18/21, para. 88). In her follow-up report, the High Commissioner reiterated that recommendation (A/HRC/19/51, para. 62 (b)). 7 The Government of Yemen has repeatedly expressed its commitment to the establishment of a national commission of inquiry. In January 2012, the Cabinet formed a ministerial committee to examine the modalities of forming such a commission. In May 2012, the Ministry of Human Rights prepared a draft presidential decree regulating the establishment of a national commission of inquiry. The draft decree was submitted to the Cabinet in June 22. A major setback with regard to accountability was the amnesty granted to former President Saleh and his associates as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative. On 21 January, Parliament adopted Law No.1/2012, which granted absolute immunity from prosecution to President Saleh, and an amnesty from criminal prosecution to all officials who worked under the President during his 33-year rule. In this way, the President and the officials were also given immunity from criminal prosecution in “politically motivated” cases. The immunity law effectively denies accountability and has therefore been met with much resentment, if not outright rejection, particularly from victims’ associations and representatives, human rights groups and activists, and various groups of protesters across 7 8 See also CCPR/C/YEM/CO/5, para. 15.