A/HRC/41/51 manifestly abusive behaviour); or (d) a restructuring proposal has been accepted by two thirds of the creditors. Seizures are allowed, but only up to the amount obtained by goodfaith creditors, namely those that participated in debt restructuring negotiations and accepted their results.44 47. Given that the French law is a positive step against the activities of vulture funds, it is regrettable that it will not apply to debts acquired before its entry into force. That leaves out of its scope the great majority of “unprotected” sovereign bonds.45 Comparison of laws on vulture funds by country Applies to all countries Applies to old debts Applies to new debts Applies to all companies Prevents suing for more than paid for debt Prevents suing for more than other creditors have accepted Belgium (2015) √ √ √ /X √ X France (2016) X X √ √ X √ UK (2010) X √ X √ X √ Source: Jubilee Campaign. VI. Forging an international consensus 48. A growing consensus on the need to curb the activities of vulture funds has emerged over the past 10 years. A number of States have expressed in several forums their support for undertaking common actions aimed at protecting heavily indebted poor countries from vulture funds and, more generally, at the establishment of an international mechanism for orderly debt restructuring. 49. At a meeting of the Group of Eight, held in May 2007, finance ministers and governors of central banks expressed their concern about the problem of aggressive litigation against heavily indebted poor countries and urged all sovereign creditors not to sell claims on those countries. 50. The same year, Commonwealth finance ministers emphasized the need for concerted international action to address vulture funds litigation and urged Governments to introduce legal protection to ensure that debt relief was provided, as a minimum, on terms equivalent to the heavily indebted poor countries framework. 51. In 2008, the member States of the European Union committed not to sell claims on heavily indebted poor countries to creditors unwilling to provide debt relief. A year earlier, the Paris Club had endorsed a similar position. 52. The signatories of the 2008 Doha Declaration on Financing for Development expressed identical concerns.46 The declaration welcomed steps taken to prevent aggressive litigation against “HIPC-eligible countries” and called on creditors not to sell claims on such countries to those refusing to participate adequately in debt relief efforts.47 53. In 2009, a recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe strongly condemned the activities of vulture funds, which “have no compunction in taking 44 45 46 47 See Fanny Galois, “Fonds vautours. La France réagit aussi” (10 April 2018), available from www.cadtm.org. According to the IMF, the 70 per cent of the bonds that do not contain enhanced clauses to protect good-faith bondholders will expire in the next 10 years. In 2014, its Executive Board endorsed the inclusion of enhanced clauses (pari passu provisions and collective action clauses) in all new international sovereign bonds. See IMF, “Third progress report on inclusion of enhanced contractual provisions in international sovereign bond contracts” (December 2017). See General Assembly resolution 63/239, annex. Ibid., para. 60. In the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, signatories reiterated their concern at noncooperative creditors who had demonstrated their ability to disrupt timely completion of debt restructuring (para. 98). 11