A/HRC/16/42 developmental initiatives and become construction projects. The participation of residents is relegated to mixing concrete or making building blocks, or worse. […] Fundamentally, the contractor-driven approach to shelter is focused on the construction of housing units. Yet shelter is far more than that45 ”. They also warn that: “When powerful external agents are driving the process within an affected village, the social capital present within longstanding communities can be ignored or even damaged46”. 44. In the case of East Timor discussed earlier, the importance and value of direct participation of the affected population in re-establishing a system of housing, land and property rights in the aftermath of the 1999 referendum was emphasized from an early stage. A 2000 report to the United Nations indicated that the majority of Timorese interviewed during a fact-finding study had confirmed the importance of involvement of customary local dispute resolution structures in future land dispute resolution and adjudication mechanisms, on the grounds of their persisting legitimacy in spite of decades of conflict and dispossession and also their role as a valuable source of “information, including details of boundaries, levels of rights and history of acquisition and loss47 ”. On the basis of these submissions from a broad range of Timorese, the report recommended that where feasible, existing local dispute resolution structures should be used as a crucial first step in dealing with land, housing and property disputes. This mediation could commence “at any of a number of levels, right down to the level of family meetings48”. 45. These and other proposals to address housing, land and property rights through the active participation of the affected people, and to build on existing community processes, were not taken up by the transitional authorities or the newly independent Government. In the aftermath of the later wave of violence, destruction and displacement of 2006-7, the need for such involvement became prominently recognised. The five pillars of the National Recovery Strategy included one aimed at building trust within communities and between the people and the Government. This was in the context of urgent attempts to achieve the reintegration and return of IDPs displaced by the violence to their communities, with the incentive of cash compensation from the State with which they could repair their homes or settle in alternative areas in cases where reintegration proved impossible. As part of a Dialogue, Communications and Outreach Programme, dialogue teams were established to manage the necessary conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation processes. This required the participation of local authorities, youth leaders and other groupings. The programme, which was still continuing in some communities in May 2010, incorporated the use of customary dispute resolution practices and peacebuilding ceremonies. It is widely regarded as having been successful and necessary for peacebuilding and the safe return of IDPs. Women reportedly participated far more actively than men in the community dialogue and reconciliation process. This was in contrast to the compensation payment process, which had been male-dominated. 46. The case of post-conflict Rwanda illustrates the use of a top-down developmental approach to land allocation, resettlement and housing in an effort to deal with the legacy of dispossession and displacement in the years leading up to and immediately following the 1994 Genocide. The majority of Rwandans had experience of forced displacement, either within the country or to a second or even third country, a reality which has shaped all subsequent efforts to manage land issues and to realize housing rights. From 1997 the Government attempted to implement the imidugudu (villagization) model nationwide, requiring the entire rural population of Rwanda to be concentrated in rural villages instead 45 46 47 48 Ibid., pp. 182-183. Ibid. p. 185. du Plessis and Leckie, J. du Plessis and S. Leckie, “Housing Property and Land Rights in East Timor”, pp. 21 and 23. Ibid., p. 36. 15