A/HRC/20/19 Prosecutor General 63. The modalities of appointment of the Prosecutor General are also important for the proper functioning of the prosecution services and there are many models. In some countries, the Prosecutor General is appointed by the Head of State with the involvement/approval of the Parliament or the Superior Council of Judiciary, on recommendation by the Minister of Justice or the President of the Republic, on recommendation by the Supreme Court and with the approval of two thirds of Parliament. In other instances, the Prosecutor General is appointed by the Supreme Court of Justice (Court of Cassation) from a list of candidates proposed by the President of the Republic. In countries where the prosecution service is attached or dependent on the executive branch of Government, the Prosecutor General may be appointed by the Executive. 64. While it is understandable that Governments wish to retain some control over the appointment of the Prosecutor General, it is important that the method of selection maintains public confidence and the respect of the judiciary and the legal profession. The Special Rapporteur believes that appointment of a Prosecutor General resulting from cooperation among different governmental bodies is preferable to one appointed by a single body, in which case expert advice should be sought.41 65. In terms of tenure, it is preferable that the Prosecutor General be appointed for a fairly long term of office, pre-established by law, for in seeking re-appointment, there is the risk of a political body behaving, or being perceived as behaving, in a way as to favour reappointment.42 Conditions of service: tenure, transfer and remuneration 66. The United Nations Guidelines stipulate that prosecutors should enjoy reasonable conditions of service, including tenure, when appropriate, remuneration and pension commensurate with the crucial role they play in the administration of justice. 43 Reasonable conditions of service contribute to ensuring that prosecutors carry out their responsibilities independently and impartially. 67. The tenure of prosecutors depends on how the prosecution service is structured. In a large number of countries, prosecutors are appointed until retirement (usually when the prosecution service is part of the judiciary), while in others they are appointed for a set period of time (where the prosecution service is independent or prosecutors are proposed by political parties and elected). The Special Rapporteur believes that security of tenure for prosecutors is an important element that reinforces their independence and impartiality. 68. Another important element that should exist within their conditions of service is the irremovability of prosecutors. The undue use of the transfer may lead to unjustifiable interference as the threat of transferring prosecutors between posts can be used as an instrument for putting pressure on a prosecutor or be a means for removing them from sensitive cases. In particular, the Special Rapporteur is concerned at instances where the transfer system may be used as a punishment or reward mechanism depending on the level of allegiance of an individual prosecutor. 41 42 43 14 Venice Commission, Report on European standards, CDL-AD(2010)040 (see footnote 9 above), paras. 34-40. See also ibid., para. 71, which suggests that a non-renewable term is preferable to the possibility of re-appointment. United Nations Guidelines, para. 6; IAP, Standards of professional responsibility, arts. 6, 3rd and 4th paras.