A/HRC/20/19 IV. Independence and impartiality of prosecutors and prosecution services 24. As mentioned above, international standards applicable to prosecutors exist at both the international and regional levels. However, these standards are meant to cover many legal systems in which the status and role of prosecutors differ, therefore they are broadly formulated so as to cover various jurisdictions. The Human Rights Council requested the Special Rapporteur to elaborate parameters to strengthen the “objectivity and impartiality” of prosecutors and prosecution services, without mentioning their “independence.” The previous Special Rapporteur had recommended that the mandate elaborate an updated study on individual and institutional parameters to ensure and strengthen the “independence” of prosecutors, among others (A/HRC/11/41, para. 104). Furthermore, the current Special Rapporteur has underlined that it is essential that prosecutors be able to play their roles independently, impartially, objectively and in a transparent manner in the discharge of their functions.7 25. Given their role as “essential agents of the administration of justice” 8 or “Ministers of Justice,” the Special Rapporteur believes that, in devoting a thematic report to prosecutors and prosecution services, it is important to analyse the models applied in domestic legal systems, identify the challenges prosecutors may encounter in the discharge of their functions and explore ways to improve their independent functioning and impartiality. 26. In assessing the independence and impartiality of prosecutors, it is important to examine both the structural independence of prosecution services and their operational independence and impartiality, or functional independence. A lack of autonomy and functional independence can erode the credibility of the prosecutorial authority and undermine public confidence in the justice system (A/HRC/17/30/Add.3, paras. 16 and 87). In this context, the United Nations Guidelines emphasize that States have a duty to ensure that prosecutors can carry out their functions without improper interference (para. 4). 27. There has been a growing tendency to move towards a more independent prosecution service model, in terms of its relationship with other authorities, notably the executive.9 In some countries, however, subordination of the prosecution service to the executive authority may often be more a question of principle than reality, in that the 7 8 9 6 See for instance A/65/274, para 18. United Nations Guidelines (see footnote 3 above), para. 3. See Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Report on European standards as regards the independence of the judicial system: Part II – The prosecution service, 3 January 2011, CDL-AD(2010)040, para. 26. The tendency registered by the Vienna Commission at national level has been also reflected in the practice or deliberations of various international bodies. In its resolution 17/2, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice further states that “the integrity, independence and impartiality of prosecutors are essential prerequisites for the effective promotion of human rights…” (preamble, 4th para.). The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights held that “the Office of the Public Prosecutor must be an organ independent of the executive branch and must have the attributes of irremovability and other constitutional guarantees afforded to members of the judicial branch” and “must have autonomy and independence from the other branches of government.” (IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico, OEA/Ser L/V/II.100, chap. V, paras. 372 and 381). The Rome Statute states that “The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court.” (art. 42, para. 1). “Neither the Prosecutor nor a Deputy Prosecutor shall participate in any matter in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground” (para. 7) or which may “affect confidence in his or her independence” (para. 5).