A/HRC/14/40 48. It was indicated, for example, that while the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal was essentially to apply international humanitarian law, the fact that the Statute of the Tribunal included crimes against humanity and violations of common article 3 required that the Tribunal also refers in its analysis to international human rights law. The Tribunal’s experience in dealing with human rights is illustrated, for instance, in the way in which it has dealt with the prohibition of torture as a crime against humanity. The Tribunal has borrowed extensively from the Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights Committee. The Tribunal has further elaborated on the notion of the link between the perpetrator and the State and has adopted a more flexible requirement concerning the characterization as an agent of the State. It was noted that while the Convention Against Torture requires an act of torture to have been inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia decided that the definition of torture in the context of crimes against humanity is not identical to the definition in the Convention and that outside the framework of the Convention, customary international law does not impose a public official requirement in relation to criminal responsibility for torture. 49. In the case of rape as a crime against humanity, the Tribunal has focused its analysis from the perspective of the human rights of women. In this respect, it was recalled that the Tribunal’s statute was the first landmark document that contained a provision classifying rape as a crime against humanity. Experts highlighted that previously rape was traditionally treated as a war crime. While rape was not mentioned in Nuremberg Charter nor prosecuted as a war crime under customary international law, it was prosecuted in Tokyo and was included in Control Council Law No. 10 as a crime against humanity. Nevertheless, although both the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocols prohibit rape, they do not list it as a grave breach to the Geneva Conventions subject to universal jurisdiction. In that respect, the experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have greatly contributed through their jurisprudence to understand the legal confines of sexual crimes, in particular rape as a crime against humanity, rape as a war crime, and rape as violation of common article 3, which reflects customary law. 50. Experts also recalled that International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia jurisprudence has established that humiliating and degrading treatment could also be characterized as a crime against humanity. According to the above Tribunal, certain types of treatment could fall under the crime of persecution, which is considered as a crime against humanity in the Statute of the Tribunal. Other acts described as “inhumane acts” also introduce gross violations of human rights to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 51. Experts referred to the experience of regional human rights courts in applying international and regional human rights instruments and international humanitarian law to conflict situations. Some experts recalled that the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have a wealth of case-law dealing with the application of the relevant human rights instruments to situations of armed conflict. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has had some opportunities to deal with cases of violation of human rights during armed conflict. For instance, in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, the Court ruled in favour of the applicant who was no longer able to have access to her properties situated in the northern part of Cyprus after the occupation of the island by Turkish troops in 1974. In the case of Ergi v. Turkey, the Court employed standards such as the principles of legitimacy, proportionality and necessity. The Court also referred to the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants; the principle of limitation in the choice of means and methods of war; and also the principle of precaution and of proportionality to be used in jus in bello. 12