A/HRC/45/12 responses at the national and subnational levels. All of this was grounded on recommendations made by the scientific and international community and driven by a recognition of the grave risks to life and health and a commitment to prevent exposure. 27. Prior funding and preparation of health systems, and coordination of interventions at the national level and through international cooperation, have played a crucial role in rapid responses by States. Public outreach campaigns to communicate key messages around prevention and containment measures have also been imperative. Best practices are characterized by transparency, information-sharing, participation and empathy, which allow States to foster public trust in leadership and institutions. 28. Given the uncertainties related to the spread and impact of the virus, precautionary measures proved to be essential. In the States with best practices, precautionary measures were translated into targeted interventions and the organization of comprehensive monitoring systems that, risk assessments permitting, allowed States to limit confinement measures and the closure of schools, while day-care establishments and basic services remained in operation. Countries with good practices also relied on information and timely preventive measures to resume activities at an earlier stage. 29. On the other hand, when the first cases were detected, a number of Governments throughout the world failed to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Some States had been increasing the risks of such a pandemic through the above-mentioned environmental harms. Some States were also inexcusably unprepared, despite repeated alerts from international authorities about the grave risks presented. While some States had been taking measures related to pandemic preparedness, others had, shockingly, eliminated key programmes in the years leading up to the COVID-19 outbreak. 30. Indeed, some Governments faced a lack of capacity and resources. 28 Others dithered, denying for several critical weeks the seriousness of the pandemic, derelict in their duty to prevent exposure. Even as cases were identified in their own countries, some States failed to recommend even the most basic preventive measures, and then resisted declaring a national emergency and imposing strict measures to prevent contagion. Instead of swift action, several leaders underestimated the risks, on the basis of unreasonable assumptions, such as that there would be a miraculous disappearance of the virus, and “herd immunity” theories, which, in practice, constitute death sentences for the most vulnerable. At the same time, such leaders decided, on the basis of economic fear, against introducing preventative and containment measures that would have minimized the overall economic impact in the long term. 31. In many countries, tens of thousands of suspected cases of COVID-19 went untested and untraced and infected persons freely circulated among the public for months, in full disregard of World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations. States were reluctant to impose restrictions at the outset, or were unable to maintain them for a reasonable period, for both political and economic reasons. Tracing programmes and protocols were not developed and resources were unavailable for testing to identify cases. Necessary decisions on how to isolate and protect various vulnerable groups were not taken. Such delays caused a rapid spread of the virus within and outside the borders of those States and a preventable loss of tens of thousands of lives. In several States, the numbers of cases and deaths related to the COVID-19 pandemic were pushed higher by a lack of coordination between national and regional or local governments. 32. Even taking into account the time normally needed to develop adequate testing capacity and preventative measures, the timing of most State responses has been inconsistent with the rapid emergency action demanded under the duty to prevent and under the international human rights standards applicable in the event of disasters, and with respect to risk management. Not only were States increasing the risks of such a pandemic by causing environmental harm, many were also inexcusably underinvesting in 28 8 See www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefingon-covid-19---11-march-2020.