A/HRC/4/42 page 11 48,000 employees undertaking functions for the coalition forces in 2006, these PMSCs have collectively converted into the de facto second largest “coalition force” in Iraq; after the United States army (which in early December 2006 had 130,000 soldiers deployed) but more than the British army (approximately 7,200 soldiers).3 The services of private military and security contractors (logistical support, supply transportation to the coalition forces, armed protection to convoys, persons and buildings as well as retraining the Iraqi army) have been playing a major role in shaping the security in Iraq.4 However, the Working Group acknowledges that the PMSCs concerned do not operate as one entity or under one command. As pointed out by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), some PMSCs have also been involved in direct combat, producing collateral damages due principally to interferences of these private contractors in the work of the United States military.5 In terms of personnel losses, by 15 November 2006 PMSCs had had 420 staff killed in Iraq, compared to 2,853 soldiers of the United States army and 125 for the British army.6 The coalition appears to have preferred to cede more and more security responsibilities to the private sector. PMSCs in Iraq commonly operate without control, without visibility, without being accountable beyond the private company itself, and in complete impunity. 32. In Iraq, PMSC employees account for 3 of 10 soldiers deployed by the regular armed forces of the coalition. During the first Gulf War, in the early 1990s, only 1 of 100 was employed by a PMSC. The exponential expansion of PMSCs is not only reflected in the number of employees, but also in the quantity of contracts, which amounted to more than US$ 100 billion in 2006.7 33. The Working Group notes information received that PMSCs operating in Iraq have recruited persons also with questionable backgrounds, with some employees having previously worked for repressive regimes.8 It can be assumed that many of the contractors from South Africa, including those now training and providing support to Iraqi police, served earlier in the South African police and army also during the former apartheid regime. It was reported that 3 Information from the United States Congress Accountability Office, June 2006, cited in “Corporate mercenaries”, War on Want report, London, 2006. 4 James Kwok, “Armed Entrepreneurs: Private Military Companies in Iraq”, Spring 2006, Harvard International Review. 5 Ibid. 6 Figures registered until 15 November 2006; see Jeremy Scahill, “Blood is thicker than Blackwater”, The Nation, 1 May 2006, www.alertnet.org, and http://icasualties.org. 7 See Reuters, “In Iraq, contractor deaths near 650, legal fog thickens”, 10 October 2006; see also alertnet.org. 8 Cf. Peter W. Singer, “The private military industry in Iraq: what we have learned and where next?”, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004.