A/HRC/31/50 prospective instrument should clarify the existing obligations of States and fill gaps that cannot be covered under domestic legal systems. The State would carry the same obligations towards all businesses, but the prospective instrument would be an additional means to ensure that corporations cannot manoeuvre States’ domestic jurisdiction to avoid liability. 71. One panellist noted that the conclusion drawn from the Guiding Principles had been heavily criticized for not addressing jurisdictional limitations in order to enable extraterritorial application, and that there were various options for operationalizing extraterritorial obligations in order to close legal gaps. Specifically, the panellist noted that extraterritorial obligations could be operationalized by creating prevention, disclosure and reporting requirements, removing obstacles to the exercise of jurisdiction, such as forum non conveniens, facilitating cross-border cooperation in investigations and mutually recognizing national judgements. The panellist went on to say that, in operationalizing extraterritorial obligations, the issue of scope did not arise and that there was no need to define “transnational corporation” when there was a positive human rights obligation regarding the duty to protect. The panellist specified that corporate activities could undermine, among many others, the rights to self-determination and to a healthy environment. The panellist noted that a global partnership to fight impunity could address the imbalances, close the gaps and strengthen the capabilities of States in international law; in this sense, the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are a useful guide. 72. One panellist noted that, in general, criminal sanctions were inadequately enforced in home States and adequate civil legal representation was not available. The panellist stressed that there was a need to address corporate veil and allow disclosure and access to documentation in order to combat impunity. Specifically, there were significant deficiencies in gaining access to remedies, even in the home States of corporations, and extraterritorial jurisdiction may raise issues of sovereignty of host States. The panellist also noted that many civil codes had clauses that could attribute liability under a tort-based approach — where a legal duty of care is owed by a company —, which could be useful. 73. A number of States highlighted the need to take into account the sovereignty of States and address only impunity. Unilateral coercive sanctions imposed by States violate and jeopardize human rights. Some delegations noted the need to balance the rights of investors with ensuring human rights. One delegation noted that States could promote human rights by requiring transnational corporations to report on how they address violations and making sure legal systems include complaint mechanisms for issues arising outside their territory. One delegation also noted the importance of ensuring access to remedies for victims. 74. One State asked the panellist whether States should provide an appropriate forum under the private law principle of forum necessitatis. In response, some of the panellists noted that private international law had limits and that the principle of forum of necessity seemed unrealistic and very ambitious. Likewise, other panellist noted that an international system for the protection of human rights could not replace national legal systems and that host and home States must ensure the existence of legal remedies for victims. 75. One business representative stressed the shortcomings of extraterritorial jurisdiction and emphasized that access to remedy should be made at the local level. He called for stronger commitments by Governments to deliver on their duty under international law to provide access to remedy and suggested that the working group should elaborate on ways of increasing pressure on Governments to become more active and improve their judicial systems by more strongly monitoring the judicial performance within the United Nations supervisory machinery. 14