A/HRC/32/36/Add.5 Political parties and associations pursuing political objectives 26. Para 76: As of May 2016, 28 political parties are registered to the National Election Commission, and 21 political parties fielded candidates for the 20th National Assembly elections in April 2016. In comparison with countries like the UK and the USA where legal threshold is not set for the number of party membership and its regional distribution as conditions to establish a political party, it cannot be said that the Republic of Korea has a relatively small number of political parties. 27. Paras 77-79: We appreciate the SR’s acknowledgement that the Republic of Korea faces unique challenges in view of the unsettled relationship with North Korea. The Government supplemented the criminality elements for Article 7 of the National Security Act (NSA) to clarify the regulations, in response to the recommendations by the UN human rights mechanisms for the concern over the danger of misuse and abuse of the NSA. With regard to its interpretation, the NSA is being applied as strictly as possible according to the rulings of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. After having ruled that some articles in the former NSA could have infringed on people’s basic rights; the Constitutional Court ruled that the amended NSA no longer violated the basic rights. 28. It is regrettable that the SR said ‘he is not convinced that the terms used in Article 7 of the NSA are as clear as the Constitutional Court pronounced,’ despite the earlier submission of a supplementary information on the Act in a written manner. And in fact, there still remain forces that follow North Korea and attempt to destroy liberal democracy. The Government whose duty is to protect its citizens needs to maintain the NSA. 29. Paras 80-81: The SR described the Unified Progressive Party (UPP) in his report as an ‘outspoken critic of the Government’, whose activities are ‘minority expressions of support for North Korea.’ The ruling was made in accordance with constitutional procedure and institution as the last resort for the Republic of Korea to secure the very existence of nation, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The SR’s description of the decision by the Constitutional Court as ‘drastic retaliatory actions’ lacks understanding as to the serious nature of the threat posed by the UPP to the national security of the Republic of Korea and is deeply regrettable. 30. The leading profile of the UPP was to praise the North Korean regime, over which the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council both have expressed their deep concern for its systematic and gross violation of human rights. They had convened a series of gatherings to conspire a potential insurrection for the benefit of North Korea and had openly espoused the North Korean regime’s argument for its nuclear arms development banned by the UN Security Council. Defining the Republic of Korea as an enemy, they discussed plans to purchase, steal and manufacture firearms and explosives, and plotted to destroy Korea’s national infrastructure including railways and communications systems in order to overthrow the nation. They even attempted to incite terrorism by providing manuals on using privately manufactured bombs. 31. These activities were not merely ‘minority expressions of support for North Korea,’ but a plot to violently rebel. Considering its probability and risks, they constituted a clear and real threat and danger to the Republic of Korea. 32. In fact, its platform, activities related to the insurrection, illegitimate primary for selecting proportional representatives, violent incidents at the Central Committee, and manipulation of polls in local elections had vindicated that the UPP’s criminal activities cannot be solely attributable to a few of its deviant members but to the UPP itself; they posed a serious threat to the democracy of the nation. In this respect, the ruling to dissolve the UPP was an indispensable measure to protect the democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the Republic of Korea. 6