A/HRC/28/28 arrests and administrative detention, secret and undisclosed detention and, in certain cases, the non-disclosure of grounds for detention. Not only are such measures inconsistent with international human rights standards, they also significantly increase the risk of torture and other ill-treatment and preclude accountability where such violations are perpetrated. In its general comment No.35, the Human Rights Committee highlighted the absolute nature of the prohibition of arbitrary detention reflected in article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pointing out that administrative detention raises a severe risk of arbitrary deprivation of liberty and should only be employed in exceptional circumstances, when a present, direct and imperative threat justifies its use, and should be limited in time. Habeas corpus is a non-derogable guarantee that must be complied with in all circumstances.11 24. In some States, the powers of intelligence services have been broadened to resemble those of the police, conferring upon them the powers of arrest, detention, search and seizure.12 In certain cases, intelligence services have been afforded powers to make arrests without a warrant and to detain, with no explicit guarantee of basic due process rights, such as the right to counsel.13 Concerns have been raised at legislation governing the functioning of intelligence services that does not provide for sufficient control and oversight, thereby creating an accountability gap.14 The functioning of intelligence services must be subject to adequate safeguards to protect against human rights violations and to ensure accountability when violations do occur. 25. The Office has highlighted ongoing concerns regarding the potential for arbitrary or unlawful interference in the right to privacy in the context of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance.15 Concerns were raised in one State where recently adopted legislation has broadened surveillance powers by allowing for surveillance of multiple computers, including whole networks, under a single warrant; established harsher penalties for the disclosure of intelligence material; provided intelligence agents with legal immunity; and allowed for greater sharing of personal information between agencies, without either adequate safeguards or oversight, or recourse for individuals in cases where personal information has been subsequently misused or released without authorization. 16 Draft legislation under consideration in another jurisdiction would allow for the outsourcing of surveillance on nationals abroad to allied foreign intelligence services, in spite of a federal court decision admonishing the intelligence service for such practices. 17 Another State recently adopted emergency surveillance legislation that allows the Government to require telephone companies and Internet providers in the country and abroad to collect and store 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 CCPR/C/GC/35. See Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014, 17 October 2014 (available from www.aph.gov.au). See Elizabeth LaForgia, “South Sudan lawmakers pass controversial security bill”, Jurist, 9 October 2014. See for example Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Special Report to Parliament, 28 January 2014. See A/HRC/27/37. See Parliament of Australia, National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No.1) 2014, available from www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd1415a/15bd019. See also Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Inquiry into the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014, 21 August 2014. See Parliament of Canada, House of Commons, Bill C-44, An Act to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and other Acts, 27 October 2014, and Federal Court Decisions, X (Re), CSIS-30-08, 22 November 2013. 9