A/HRC/12/48 page 115 which the fighters reportedly stated that rockets and mortars were launched in close proximity to homes and alleyways “in the hope that nearby civilians would deter Israel from responding”.311 454. The Mission now turns to the related but distinct question of whether and to what extent Palestinian armed groups made use of residential housing and of protected sites, such as schools, hospitals, mosques and United Nations facilities, in their engagements with Israeli ground forces. 455. The Mission also examined the question of the presence and activities of members of Palestinian armed groups in chapter XI. As already mentioned, Palestinian witnesses were generally reluctant to speak to the Mission about the activity of Palestinian armed groups in their neighbourhoods. For the present purposes, it suffices to say that, in some of the cases, there was evidence of the presence of Palestinian armed groups in residential areas.312 456. The Mission received a submission from a colonel of the reserve of the Israeli armed forces that seeks to illuminate the “combat principles” of Palestinian armed groups. His report is based on material published by Palestinian armed groups on their websites. The report describes alleged tactics such as “seizing houses as military positions for the purpose of staging ambushes against IDF forces” and “deploying explosive charges of various types (IEDs, penetrating, bounding, anti personnel etc.) in the vicinity of residences and detonating them”, “boobytrapping houses … and detonating the charges”, and “conducting fighting and sniper fire at IDF forces operating in the built-up areas”.313 457. This submission provides useful information. It tends to show, for instance, that ground engagements between Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups were most intense in areas of mixed urban-rural character on the outskirts of Gaza City, Jabaliyah and Beit Lahia. 458. The Mission notes, however, that the one incident described in the submission which it has investigated itself illustrates the unreliability of some of the sources the report relies on. In this incident, the source claimed that three Palestinian combatants had laid an ambush in a house in Izbat Abd Rabbo, hurled explosives at the Israeli armed forces and managed to drag a wounded Israeli soldier into the house. From the facts it has itself gathered, the Mission can exclude that in this incident the Palestinian combatants managed to capture an Israeli soldier. This example suggests that some websites of Palestinian armed groups might magnify the extent to which Palestinians successfully attacked Israeli forces in urban areas. 459. Other sources reviewed by the Mission confirm scepticism about the intensity of attacks on the Israeli armed forces by Palestinian armed groups in built-up areas. The Mission notes that a thread running through many of the Israeli soldiers’ testimonies collected by the Israeli NGO Breaking the Silence is that they had no encounters with Palestinian combatants.314 According to another NGO report, “Hamas fighters plainly were frustrated by their inability to engage in street 311 “Gaza’s unfinished business…”, p. 3. 312 See the case of Majdi Abd Rabbo in chapter XIV. 313 “The hidden dimension of Palestinian war casualties…”, pp. 1-2 and 20. 314 Soldiers’ Testimonies… , testimony 34, p. 76, and Rabin Academy testimonies.