A/HRC/12/48 page 109 429. An “obituary” published on a website of al-Qassam Brigades states that one of the training courses at the police headquarters in Gaza on 27 December 2008 was a “military refresher course”. That is, however, contradicted by the police spokesperson and a number of the reports received by the Mission from NGOs. It is also not suggested by the Israeli Government that that was a reason for attacking it. As a distinct probability, the Mission finds that the policemen killed there were neither engaged in any military activity at the time of the attacks nor carrying out preparations for combat. At the other police stations, the police were engaged in a range of routine tasks, including questioning detainees and handling issues for members of the public who were present in police facilities in the middle of an ordinary day. 5. (a) Legal analysis The applicable rules of international humanitarian law 430. The general rule of international humanitarian law is that members of law-enforcement agencies are considered part of the civilian population, unless they have been incorporated into the armed forces of a party to the conflict.285 This principle is accepted by the Israeli Government.286 The obligation to distinguish at all times between the civilian population and combatants and to direct attacks only against military objectives287 (the principle of distinction) therefore generally prohibits attacks against members of the law-enforcement agencies. In its Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice recognized the principle of distinction as an “intransgressible” principle of customary international law. 431. There are three situations in which direct attacks against members of police forces would not constitute a violation of the principle of distinction. First, if the law-enforcement agency or the unit to which the policeman belongs has been “incorporated” into the armed forces, thus conferring combatant status upon its members. Second, if individual members of the lawenforcement agency are at the same time members of an armed group, they would be combatants.288 Thirdly, individual members of the law-enforcement agency, like any civilians, Article 43 (3) of Additional Protocol I provides: “Whenever a party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other parties to the conflict.” 285 “The operation in Gaza…” (para. 238) states that “whereas members of a civilian police force that is solely a civilian police force, who have no combat function are not considered combatants under the Law of Armed Conflict, international law recognizes that this principle does not apply where police are part of the armed forces of a party.” 286 287 Article 48 of Additional Protocol I expresses the principle in the following terms: In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I argues that “any interpretation which would allow combatants as meant in article 43 to “demobilize” at will in order to return to their status as civilians and to take up their status as combatants once again, as the situation changes or as military operations may require, would have the effect of cancelling any progress that this article has achieved. … [Article 44] does not allow this combatant to have the status of a combatant while he is in action, and the status of a civilian at other times” (pp. 515-516). 288