A/HRC/25/43 Républicaines (UFR) and the Alliance pour la Refondation (A2R), and also the Convention Patriotique du Salut du Kodro (CPSK), formed in June 2012 by General Moussa Dhaffane, a former commander in CPJP, which he left because of a major political disagreement. 28. The former Séléka committed many unlawful acts during their offensive in December 2012 and after seizing power in March 2013, including pillaging and killings, targeting members of the security forces of the former regime and administration officials perceived to be supporters of the Bozizé regime.14 29. According to some Central Africans, the unlawful acts committed by the former Séléka on seizing power went far beyond anything seen before in that country. By attacking Christian communities and sparing Muslims, they helped to destroy the relations between the two communities. 30. According to some sources, the first incursions of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north-east of the Central African Republic were observed in 200615 and it has been in the south-east of the country since 2008.16 In his 2011 report on his mission to the Central African Republic, the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons deplored the fact that the international community had not paid adequate attention to LRA atrocities (A/HRC/16/43/Add.4, para. 80). In 2012, the LRA committed many abuses against the civilian population, including abductions (see S/2012/374, para. 13), and continues to pose a threat to national security. 31. The problem of highway robbers, also known as zaraguinas, apparently dates back to the 1980s but became more acute in the mid-1990s. They seem to operate more or less everywhere in the Central African Republic. Zaraguinas have committed numerous criminal acts against the civilian population, from attacking travellers and cattle farmers, to pillaging (S/2001/660, para. 20) and kidnapping for ransom. They are apparently well armed and operate in groups of various kinds: part-time bandits (members of the security forces using their service weapons for criminal purposes), cattle farmers, and former foreign mercenaries who helped President Bozizé to seize power in 2003.17 32. The formation of self-defence groups, or village militias, can be explained by the need to fill the security vacuum resulting from the security forces’ failure to do anything about the threat from highway robbers, particularly in the north-west of the country. However, action by these groups has not always been a matter of defending themselves from bandits. Self-defence groups, or village committees, have sometimes sided with a rebel movement — APRD, for example — and sometimes with the army. In 2008, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report on the situation in the Central African Republic, noted that, in Ouham-Pendé prefecture, some self-defence groups had supported government forces against rebel movements (see S/2008/733, para. 17). The selfdefence groups did nothing when the former Séléka took power and it was in reaction to the abuses by ex-Séléka that they resurfaced. 33. An important factor in the prevailing insecurity in the Central African Republic is the circulation of small arms and light weapons. The number of weapons available to the security forces (mainly the Central African Armed Forces, the gendarmerie, the police and 14 15 16 17 GE.14-11122 Amnesty International, “République centrafricaine: la crise des droits humains devient incontrôlable”, October 2013, pp. 16 and 17. International Crisis Group, “République centrafricaine: Anatomie d’un état fantôme”, Rapport Afrique No. 136, 13 December 2007, p. 26. International Crisis Group, “République centrafricaine: les urgences de la transition”, Rapport Afrique No. 203, 11 June 2013, p. ii. See S. Spittaels and F. Hilgert, “Mapping Conflict Motives: Central African Republic”, International Peace Information Service, February 2009, pp. 17 and 18. 7